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SUMMARY 
An abundant amount of research has discussed the declining performance of well-
established companies in the face of discontinuous innovations. As a type of technological 
innovations, discontinuous innovations destroy the usefulness of existing architectural 
knowledge and the technical skills of established incumbents who are bounded by 
traditions, existing technological paradigms, sunk costs, internal political constraints and 
have difficulties acquiring and applying new knowledge and skills. In order to help 
established incumbents overcome the difficulties of dealing with discontinuous 
innovations, several counterexamples are studied. Based on their resources and 
competencies, it is still possible for established incumbents to either recapture their 
previous market or technological positions, or remain leaders while confronting 
discontinuous innovations. These competencies include market competencies, inter-firm 
collaborative relationships with technology providers, incorporating internal 
complementary knowledge, learning from unique historical conditions and environment 
turbulence. However, we still don’t know whether established incumbents are able to 
create discontinuous innovation initiatively. 
 
Based on the literature review, we raised the following research questions.   
• How do “inferior-technology” incumbents win over their “superior-
technology” competitors through discontinuous innovation? 
• What kinds of competencies are needed for established incumbents to create 
discontinuous innovation when they are technologically inferior to their peers?  
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An in-depth case in the video game industry is carefully studied to address those questions. 
Nintendo, a historical player in this industry, successfully shifted its innovation direction 
along the traditional path and won over its “high-performance” competitors with its new 
generation game console “Wii”, a product of discontinuous innovation. Through the 
secondary data and patent analysis, we discussed Nintendo’s heterogeneous competencies 
as well as Wii’s strengths and weakness in comparison with it competing products, 
PlayStation 3 and Xbox360. We also extend the comparisons to the previous generations. 
Based on these discussions, we draw the following conclusions to provide useful 
suggestions to industry managers and researchers in the area of technological innovation 
management.  
 
v  “Inferior-technology” incumbents can win over their “superior-technology” 
competitors through discontinuous innovation along secondary features.  
v  Cooperative competencies, including market competencies, collaborative 
relations, incorporating internal complementary knowledge, and learning the 
experiences from unique historical conditions and environment turbulence, are 
needed for established incumbent to create discontinuous innovation when they 






Creating discontinuous innovation: the case of Nintendo’s Wii 
- viii -    
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 2.1   Definitions of company competencies………………………………………. 32 
Table 3.1   Relevant situations for different research strategies………………………….37 
Table 3.2    Four dimensions of product………………………………………………….42 
Table 4.1   Overview of patent data for three companies………………………………...65 
Table 4.2   Interview sheets………………………………………………………………79 
Table 4.3   Breakdown of Wii Remote…………………………………………………...83 
Table 4.4   Comparison of four dimensions……………………………………………...87 
Table 4.5   Comparisons of primary performance and secondary features………………89 












Creating discontinuous innovation: the case of Nintendo’s Wii 
- ix -    
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1.1   Structure of the thesis…………………………………………………………9 
Figure 2.1   Types of technological innovation…………………………………………..16 
Figure 2.2   Relationship between discontinuous innovation and disruptive technology...18 
Figure 3.1   Classification of research methodologies……………………………………36 
Figure 3.2   Structure of data collection…………………………………………………..43 
Figure 4.1   Structure of video game industry…………………………………………….47 
Figure 4.2   Color TV Game……………………………………………………………...53 
Figure 4.3   Game & Watch………………………………………………………………54 
Figure 4.4   Nintendo Entertainment System and Nintendo Family Computer…………..55 
Figure 4.5   Game Boy……………………………………………………………………55 
Figure 4.6   Super Nintendo Entertainment System and Super Family Computer……….56 
Figure 4.7   Nintendo 64………………………………………………………………….57 
Figure 4.8   GameCube…………………………………………………………………...58 
Figure 4.9   Game Boy Advance (GBA)………………………………………………….59 
Figure 4.10  Nintendo DS………………………………………………………………...59 
Figure 4.11  Wii…………………………………………………………………………..60 
Figure 4.12  US Patent Class for three companies (“game console” & company name)..66 
Figure 4.13  Patent No. of competitive companies………………………………………68 
Figure 4.14  (a) US Patent No. of three major players (“game console”)……………….72 
Figure 4.14  (b) US Patent Class for three major players (“game console”)……… …….73 
Figure 4.15  Experiences on Wii…………………………………………………………76 
Figure 4.16  Historical comparisons of Nintendo, Sony & Microsoft……………………92 
Creating discontinuous innovation: the case of Nintendo’s Wii 
- x -    







































Creating discontinuous innovation: the case of Nintendo’s Wii 
                                                                                                             - 1 -                                                                                                                         
    
Chapter 1   Introduction 
 
1.1   Motivation 
In 1995 Christensen released his bestselling book The Innovator’s Dilemma to the world, 
igniting the now popular discussions about the failure of established incumbents to stay 
atop their industries when confronted with certain types of market and technological 
changes. Christensen offers an explanation to the puzzle of why these incumbents who are 
characterized by good management practices and widely-recognized advanced 
technological innovation abilities suddenly become inhibitors to other types of 
technological innovation, commonly known as discontinuous innovation.  
 
Abundant examples in the business world have demonstrated the repeated and intriguing 
phenomenon of incumbents being beaten by “inferior technology” entrants.  Often, the 
incumbents are beaten by products made from off-the-shelf components rather than those 
developed by state-of-the-art technologies. Usually, incumbents who focus on the most 
lucrative customer segmentation lose their market share and profits to late entrants who 
target latent customers and expanding customer populations. A well-known case is how 
Apple, then a new start-up in the early 1980s, was able to attack DEC's and HP's 
minicomputer market with a simpler, lower-performing desktop personal computer.  The 
personal computer, although originally designed to be a toy to be used in the home, 
changed the perception of computers in the workplace as they had previously been 
operated only by trained technicians (Christensen 1997).  The personal computer market 
grew rapidly yet was ignored by minicomputer manufacturers. The dominance of 
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established minicomputer manufacturers was soon replaced by new entrants with simple 
and cheap technologies. Termed ‘disruptive technologies’ by Christensen, these provide a 
different technology-product-market paradigm and offer new value appreciated by new 
customers (Bower and Christensen, 1995). Disruptive technologies make the existing 
technological paradigms of established incumbents obsolete and bring new experience to 
customers. According to Veryzer’s framework (1998), the innovations are both 
technologically and commercially discontinuous. Thus, the examples mentioned above 
can be categorized as one type of discontinuous innovations.  
 
Industrial examples have inspired much broad and in-depth research from academia. 
Various studies have been conducted to investigate the declining performance of well-
established companies in the face of discontinuous innovation. Discontinuous innovations 
destroy established incumbents’ competencies in product and process improvement, 
thereby increasing environment turbulence (Tushman & Anderson, 1986). They also 
destroy the usefulness of the existing architectural knowledge and technical skills of 
established incumbents who find it difficult to acquire and apply new knowledge and 
skills (Henderson & Clark, 1990). Path dependency simultaneously enhances and inhibits 
innovation, especially for established incumbents (Leonard-Barton, 1992). When the 
paradigm changes, it is difficult for established companies to recognize the shifts and 
acquire new knowledge to adapt to the new environment due to their traditional bounds, 
existing technological paradigms, sunk costs and internal political constraints (Tilton, 
1971; Hannan and Freeman, 1977). By contrast, new entrants to the industry who tend to 
be smaller in size, have shorter (path-dependent) histories and fewer commitments to the 
old value networks, are better suited to developing and commercializing emerging 
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technologies (Astley, 1985; Abernathy and Clark, 1985). Discontinuous innovation is 
regarded as an effective means for new entrants to overcome their weakness in existing 
technology paradigm (Tilton, 1971; Hannan and Freeman, 1977; Abernathy and Utterback, 
1978; Henderson & Clark, 1990; Christensen, 1997).  
 
However, another group of scholars reveal several counterexamples which demonstrate 
that established incumbents are still capable of recapturing their previous market or 
technological positions and remaining leaders while discontinuous innovations occur 
(Ahuja and Lampert, 2001; D Methe, Swaminathan, Mitchell and Toyama, 1997; 
Rosenbloom and Christensen, 1998; Rothaermel, 2001). Based on the previous literature, 
various competencies have been proposed for incumbents’ continued leadership in face of 
discontinuous innovation: persistent market competencies of shedding unique insights 
about customer needs or identifying new markets (Abernathy and Clark, 1985), inter-firm 
collaborative relationships with technology providers (Mitchell and Singh, 1996, and 
Rothaermel, 2001), incorporating internal complementary knowledge (Tripsas, 1997) and 
learning from unique historical conditions and environment turbulence (Barney, 1991; 
Hill, 2003). 
 
However, it has never been addressed whether established incumbents can take an 
initiative in discontinuous innovation. After incumbents have acquired how to respond to 
and defeat the attacks of discontinuous innovation, it is more important that they can adopt 
it as a competitive strategy initiatively and effectively, especially for those “inferior-
technology”, who are relatively weaker than their competitors in terms of technology 
development. Established incumbents have successfully pursued the path of continuous 
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innovation for long time, and the recent industry history suggests that “in a competitive 
technology-intensive global market, advantages are built and renewed through the more 
discontinuous form of innovation” (Lynn, Morone and Paulson, 1996, pp10). We aimed to 
find out whether discontinuous innovation can serve as an effective strategy for 
established incumbents among the technology-intensive competition, and whether the 
competencies (e.g. market competencies, inter-firm collaborative relationships, 
incorporating internal complementary knowledge and learning from unique historical 
conditions and environment turbulence) that help incumbents successfully adapt to 
discontinuous innovation can become active drivers stimulating the adoption of this 
strategy.   
 
As for technology-intensive competition among established incumbents, company 
competencies and capabilities have been regarded as a black box for a long time. Although 
technological competencies represent an important advantage in technologically 
competitive markets (e.g. Carey, 1992; Nelson, 1991), not all firms with advanced 
technological competencies have super performances (Teece, 1986; Teece, Pisano and 
Shuen, 1997). To open this black box in the broadest sense and help “inferior-technology” 
incumbents overcome their weaknesses in technological competencies, we try to address 
our research questions from a resource-based view.  
 
1.2   Research Objectives 
Inspired by the limitations of the studies in dynamics between established incumbents and 
discontinuous innovation that were discussed above, we looked at and screened existing 
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industrial events as our research object. A living case that fits with our interest in the 
dynamics of discontinuous innovation and established incumbents is the video game 
console industry. Over the past two decades, the video game industry has grown into a 
respected entertainment medium with annual sales rivaling box office receipts for the 
movie industry. Nintendo, as a historical player in this industry, successfully shifts its 
innovation direction along the traditional path. Most recently, Nintendo won over its 
“high-performance” competitors with the new generation game console “Wii”, a product 
fitting the category of discontinuous innovation.  
 
The video game industry, especially the U.S, is often cited as an example of network 
effect and radical technological innovation (Schilling, 2003, Gallagher & Park, 2002, 
Clements & Ohashi, 2005, Shankar & Bayus, 2003). However, after Sony replaced 
Nintendo as the dominant player and the software giant Microsoft entered the market, 
product standards seem to be instituted. Now, with its new generation machine “Wii”, 
Nintendo is trying to reclaim its place as the benchmark in video gaming and redefine the 
boundary of mainstream customers, making it a valuable case for discontinuous 
innovation research.  
 
Based on industry observations and a literature review, we raise the research questions of 
how “inferior-technology” incumbents win over their “superior-technology” competitors 
through discontinuous innovation, and what kind of competencies are needed for 
established incumbents to create discontinuous innovations when they are technologically 
inferior to their peers. We try to address these questions through an in-depth case study 
and empirical analysis of Nintendo’s Wii. The research focus centres on an analysis of the 
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product development process in discontinuous innovation, as well as the company-specific 
competencies that can compensate for weakness in technology development, thereby 
stimulating the creation of discontinuous innovation. This study is neither an attempt to 
generalize how established companies take initiatives to create discontinuous innovation 
nor an offering of normative prescriptions (Hill and Rothaermel, 2003). Our research 
objective is: 
 
• To identify the ways in which incumbents are able to initiate discontinuous innovation 
when they are technologically inferior to their peers from a resource-based view.  
 
1.3   Thesis Structure  
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows.  
 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
This chapter mainly reviews the literature on technological innovation management. It 
covers the definition of technology and technological innovation, classifications of 
technological innovation and the varied performance in front of different types of 
technological innovation for established incumbents and new entrants, e.g. incremental 
innovations, radical innovations, disruptive innovations. It is followed by an extensive 
review of the literature relating to incumbents’ survival in the face of discontinuous 
innovation. Those strategies then guide our research focus to company-specific 
competencies. We regard the competencies as heterogeneous company-specific resources, 
accumulated through an idiosyncratic history and difficult for competitors and followers 
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to emulate. This assumption leads us to further review the theories relating to company 
competency from a resource-based view. This chapter is concluded by offering a couple 
research questions based on the literature review that was conducted.  
 
Chapter 3: Research Methodology 
The literature review chapter is followed by a research methodology chapter which 
explains the reasons why we adopted a single case study as our research method rather 
than any other research strategy. The case study is a primary candidate for research on 
discontinuous innovation because such work can provide critical insights and also lay a 
foundation for further research (Veryzer, 1998). According to Yin (2003), case studies are 
suitable for answering who, why, how and what questions, while the data is principally 
collected from interviews, expressed both verbally and literally. A careful study of a single 
case may lead researchers to see new theoretical relationships. This fits well with our 
research objective of unraveling the process through which established incumbents 
initiatively create discontinuous innovations.  
 
Chapter 4: Data and Analysis 
In the next chapter an in-depth case study of Nintendo and its latest game console Wii is 
presented. This illustrates how a discontinuous innovation is initiatively created by an 
established company, helping the historical player with inferior technological 
competencies win back its predominance within the industry. Although Nintendo has been 
in the shadow of its superior-technology competitors for a number of years and the future 
of the industry is uncertain, the achievement Nintendo has gained so far and the 
significant changes it brings to the whole video game industry is undoubted. This chapter 
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describes how we collect data from diverse sources, e.g. magazines, newspapers, company 
official websites and established electronic game websites. Data collection and analysis 
are divided into three parts: the industry level, company level and product level.  
 
Chapter 5: Discussion 
In the subsequent chapter we draw out our analytical discussions and conclusions. The 
research questions are addressed and the research findings are presented according to the 
data collected and the analysis conducted previously. 
 
Chapter 6: Conclusions and Implications 
We end the whole work with summaries of our research findings as well as their 
implications for scholars and managers. The implication for established comapnies 
include how to overcome the difficulties of inferior R&D abilities and technological 
competencies, how to initiate discontinuous innovation, how to develop new products and 
create non-existing markets despite traditions, existing technological paradigms, sunk 
costs, and resource constraints. Finally, we discuss the limitations of this study and the 
future research it may bring forward.  
 
The flow of our research and the basic structure described above are illustrated in Figure 
1.1 
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Chapter 2    Literature Review 
 
2.1   Introduction 
In order to study the new linkage between established incumbents and discontinuous 
innovation, we first conducted a review of the technological innovation management 
literature to give us an overview of the research in this area and identify unresolved 
problems. The introduction to technological innovation management begins with 
definitions and classification and is then followed by a description of various company 
performances in the face of different types of innovations. Technological innovations are 
categorized as continuous innovations or discontinuous innovations. Since our focus is on 
discontinuous innovation, we have dedicated specific sections to describing the 
association between discontinuous innovation and disruptive technology, as well as 
established incumbents’ declining performances in face of discontinuous innovations. 
After briefly explaining how and why established companies always face greater 
difficulties in adjusting to discontinuous innovations, we expand the view with some 
counterexamples describing how incumbents can recapture their technological and market 
dominance in spite of discontinuous innovations introduced by new entrants. Since the 
strategies proposed for incumbents who face discontinuous innovations can be analyzed 
through companies’ heterogeneous competency and resource sets which are accumulated 
through their idiosyncratic history and difficult for competitors and followers to emulate, 
the literature relating to the resource-based view is reviewed. This chapter ends by 
identifying the research gap and proposing research questions formulated after the 
literature reviews.  
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The main sources of our literature are leading technology and management journals. They 
include the Academy of Management Review, Administrative Science Quarterly, IEEE 
Transactions on Engineering Management, International Journal of Technology 
Management, Journal of Product Innovation Management, Strategic Management Journal, 
R&D Management and Research Policy as well as the Harvard Business Review and 
Sloan Management Review. In addition, we reviewed some textbooks to obtain a 
comprehensive understanding of technological innovation management. The textbooks 
included Strategic Management of Technological Innovation by Schilling (2005) and, in 
order to be familiar with popular ideas among practitioners, some bestselling books. These 
best sellers included Moore (1999)’s Crossing the Chasm: Marketing and Selling High-
Tech Products to Mainstream Customers and The Innovator's Dilemma: When New 
Technologies Cause Great Firms to Fail from Christensen (1997). These sources allowed 
us to learn classic and new theories as well as principles and tools to enrich our 
understanding of technological innovation management and build a preliminary structure 
to address the research questions. 
 
2.2   Technological Innovation Management 
 
2.2.1   Introduction 
Technology is defined as the practical application of knowledge, especially in a particular 
area, or a capability created by the practical application of knowledge (Greisler and 
Stupak, 2006). It can be divided into process technology, referring to the tools, devices 
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and knowledge that mediate the process of converting input to output, and product 
technology, which creates new things, either tangible products or intangible services 
(Rosenberg, 1972). Technology usually refers to a cluster of technologies that, when 
applied in a specific area, determine the particular problems, procedures and tasks. This 
technological cluster is also called a “technological paradigm”. This is analogous with 
“scientific paradigm” which refers to “a model and a pattern of solution of selected 
technological problems, based on selected principles derived from natural sciences and on 
the selected material technologies” (Dosi, 1982, pp 152).  
 
Innovation can be stimulated by changes in technology or the technological paradigm 
(Abernathy and Clark, 1985), either driven by technological genius (Taton, 1958; 
Schumpeter, 1961) or a function of economic demand and growth (Schmookier, 1966; 
Merton, 1968). We refer to this technological innovation as the “act of introducing a new 
device, method or material for application to commercial or practical objectives.” Studies 
show that firms consider technological innovation to be their most important driver of 
competitive success (Schilling, 2005). During the 1950s and 1960s, technology was 
recognized as the primary driver of technological innovation. Numerous models have been 
constructed to describe the innovation process for activities like invention or technology 
improvement, commercialization an invention or technology by a set of engineering and 
manufacturing activities and delivering the final product to its customers or end-users by 
intensive marketing. Later on, clearly identifying customer needs was recognized to be 
increasingly influential on the success of a technological innovation. Researchers within 
an organization develop technology in efforts to meet changing customer needs. Rather 
than restricting discussions to whether technological innovation is driven by technology or 
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market, the studies in technological innovation are expanding to other domains. Scholars 
and managers are racing to develop a better understanding of technological innovation. A 
wide range of work on this topic has emerged and flourished, such as the classification of 
different types of technological innovation (e.g. Tushman and Anderson, 1986; Henderson 
and Clark, 1990), strategic management of technological innovation process (e.g. Teece, 
Pisano, and Shuen, 1997), organization theory (e.g. Daft, 1978; Miller and Friesen, 1982), 
economics (e.g. Rosenberg, 1982) and sociology (e.g. Gopalakrishnan and Damanpour, 
1997).  
 
The flourishing research in technological innovation management had led to numerous 
works on how to measure the different degrees and directions of the radicalness of an 
innovation. In reviewing the literature, various bases have been used. There are many 
innovations falling into this continuum from “improving and refining” at one end to 
“disrupting, destroying and making obsolete” at the other end, as well as all points in 
between (Abernathy and Clark, 1985). From an incumbent’s perspective, technological 
innovation can be divided into two categories. One is commonly used by incumbents to 
entrench their predominant market position, including introducing changes to the existing 
product, building improvement on existing know-how, and exploiting the potential of the 
established paradigm. Established companies usually enjoy advantages in this type of 
innovation under the names of incremental innovations (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Ettlie, 
Bridges, and O'Keefe, 1984; Dewar and Dutton, 1986; Tushman and Anderson, 1986), 
competency-enhancing innovations (Tushman and Anderson, 1986), modular innovations 
(Henderson and Clark, 1990) or technological evolutions (Ehrnberg, 1995). Contrarily, the 
other type of technological innovation is usually favored by new entrants, resulting in 
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declining performances among incumbents. Because it is based on new sets of engineering 
and scientific paradigms and requires new skills and knowledge to operate, the new 
technologies are fundamentally different from the existing paradigms (Olleros, 1986; 
Hamilton and Singh, 1992). Radical innovations (Dess and Beard, 1984; Ettlie, Bridges, 
and O'Keefe, 1984; Dewar and Dutton, 1986; Utterback and Kim, 1986), architecture 
innovations (Henderson and Clark, 1990), competency-destroying innovations (Tushman 
and Anderson, 1986) and technological revolutions (Ehrnberg, 1995) fall into this 
category.  
 
To unify the terminologies used later in this thesis, we use “continuous” and 
“discontinuous” to differentiate these two types of technological innovations (Robertson, 
1967; Anderson and Tushman, 1990; Kotabe and Swan, 1995; Veryzer, 1998; Ding and 
Peters, 2000). Discontinuous innovation is regarded as an effective solution for new 
entrants to overcome their weakness in the existing technology paradigm and defend their 
existence in the industry.  
 
Discontinuous/continuous innovations can also be linked with technology and market 
when they are defined as the major drivers of technological innovation. Four different 
strategies for new entrants and established incumbents can be generated from these 
linkages. They are continuous innovation/market-pull strategies, continuous 
innovation/technology-push strategies, discontinuous innovation/market-pull strategies 
and discontinuous innovation/technology-push strategies (Walsh, Kirchhoff, and Newber, 
2002). Continuous innovation is linked to the outcomes of evolutionary technology while 
discontinuous innovation is defined as evolving from disruptive technology. Based on a 
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survey conducted in the MEMS (Microsystems technologies or Micro Machined 
Technologies) industry, Walsh, Kirchhoff and Newber concluded that whether driven by 
technology or market, established incumbents had their advantages in creating continuous 
innovations due to strong marketing groups, solid customer relationships and reliable 
suppliers along the established supply chain. They are always targeting existing customers, 
either providing them with superior substitutes for existing products that offer cost saving 
and/or quality advantages or educating them to use a new product whose technological 
base is similar to an existing product. On the other hand, for new entrants, especially those 
creating discontinuous innovation, the commercialization process is risky, costly and 
requires an uncertain time period. Therefore, they are encouraged to develop market 
competencies which can help them identify potential customers in multiple industries and, 
finally, to modify their technology so it can improve or replace the existing products of 
established competitors. 
 
2.2.2   Discontinuous innovation and disruptive technology 
 “In a competitive technology-intensive global market, advantages are built and renewed 
through the more discontinuous form of innovation.” (Lynn, Morone and Paulson, 1996, 
pp10) Discontinuous innovations are no longer the exclusive weapon of new entrants. The 
dynamics between discontinuous innovations and established incumbents greatly inspire 
researchers’ and managers’ interests. Before we go deeply into this relationship, we will 
first try to achieve a better understanding about discontinuous innovation and the related 
disruptive technology, which we define as an important form of discontinuous innovation.  
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Discontinuity may occur in technology or customer utility, or both. Based on Veryzer’s 
work (1998), we adopt the matrix shown in Figure 2.1 as our analytical tool for classifying 
innovation. Two critical dimensions, the technological capability and commercial 
capability, are used to delineate the various levels or degrees of change in a product. The 
technological capability dimension refers to the degree that a product involves expanding 
technologies which determine the way product functions are performed (Veryzer, 1998). 
Technological discontinuities take place when a new capability appears that is beyond the 
existing boundaries and cannot be achieved by the extension of companies’ existing 
technologies. The commercial capability dimension describes the benefits of the product 
as perceived and experienced by the customer or user. Commercial discontinuity can 
result in changes to existing customers regarding the way a product is perceived and used. 
Alternatively, it can create a completely new market where those who were previously 
interested in this product become profitable customers.   
                                           



















Source: Veryzer, 1998 
Commercial Capability 
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Discontinuous innovations are usually associated with disruptive technologies (Walsh and 
Linton, 2000). A variety of perspectives have emerged on the definitions of discontinuous 
innovation and disruptive technologies, and no single view is widely accepted (Carroad 
and Carroad, 1982; Meyers and Tucker, 1989; Mckee, 1992; Bower and Christensen, 1995; 
Ehrenberg, 1995; Walsh, 1996; Veryzer, 1998; Moore, 1999). Disruptive technology 
provides a technology-product-market paradigm (Bower and Christensen, 1995) that 
differs from established incumbents’ existing technological trajectories, the rate and 
direction of technology improvements, diffusion and other aspects (Schilling, 2005).  
Disruptive technology offers new value to new customers for new application, which 
often has lower margin opportunities and is unappreciated by established incumbents’ 
existing customers (Christensen, 1997). The new technology and new application result in 
both technologically and commercially discontinuous innovation. According to Veryzer’s 
framework (1998) that we adopted earlier, we claim that innovation based on disruptive 
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Christensen coined the term “disruptive technology”, (Bower and Christensen 1995) based 
on the concept of creative destruction (Schumpeter, 1942). This term was needed in order 
to address the consistent but interesting business pattern that companies who stay atop 
their industries always suffer when confronted with certain types of market and 
technological changes. It has been emphasized that this pattern is not about the failure of 
simply any company, but rather of good companies whose management practices and 
innovation abilities are greatly admired and emulated by their industry peers. This pattern 

















Creating discontinuous innovation: the case of Nintendo’s Wii 
                                                                                                             - 19 -                                                                                                                         
    
Christensen didn’t provide a clear-cut definition of disruptive technology, but explained it 
as “typically simpler, cheaper, and more reliable and convenient than established 
technologies” (Christensen, 1997, pp 190).  Different definitions of disruptive technology 
have emerged since Christensen published his best-seller The Innovator’s Dilemma in 
1997. Kassicieh (2002) describes disruptive technologies as scientific discoveries that 
possess a disruptive power to disturb or destroy common product or technology 
capabilities by providing a new competitive technological paradigm. In Erwin Danneels’ 
2004 work Disruptive Technology Reconsidered: a Critique and Research Agenda, he 
concluded that the core nature of disruptive technology is to change the basis of 
competition by changing the technology/product performance metrics along which firms 
compete. Govindarajan and Kopalle (2006) proposed that disruptive technology-related 
innovations are the introduction of a different set of features, performances and price 
attributes relative to the existing product that, although they are unattractive to mainstream 
customers, they may be valued by a different customer segment. They expand the 
discussion of disruptive technology-related innovation to include high-end technologies 
with a higher price, which are also unacceptable in the mainstream market.  Schmidt 
(2004) establishes a model to predict the moment of disruption. Two parameters of this 
model are the traditional attributes of the product, which overshoot the market demand, 
and the secondary attributes, which are under-served. Disruptive technology successfully 
satisfies the requirements of the secondary attributes while sacrificing traditional 
performances. When the performances of the traditional set improve over time and finally 
move up to the mainstream market, disruption occurs. Other scholars attribute the 
emergence of disruption to decreasing marginal utility to existing needs and the newly 
appreciated marginal utility to latent needs (Adner, 2002; Paap and Katz, 2004). This 
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perspective relies on how customers evaluate technology and how this evaluation may 
change. Exploring the latent needs of current customers and the needs of future customers 
means not just emphasizing what customers ask for, but focusing on what they really need. 
These latent needs may not even be realized by customers themselves and they can change 
over time, as the environment they live in also changes. It has been argued for a long time 
that listening too much to existing customers may restrict the innovation progress along 
the existing technological trajectories, therefore reducing the chance of making a 
substantial breakthrough (Slater and Narver, 1998; Chandy and Tellis, 1998; Day, 1999). 
 
According to different forms of disruption, Christensen categorized disruptive 
technologies into two types. They are “low-end disruptions”, cheaper and simpler with an 
inferior performance, and “new-market disruptions”, which he described as an “innovation 
that enables a larger population of people who previously lacked the money or skill now 
to begin buying and using a product” (Christensen and Raynor, 2003, pp 102). The view 
of disruptive technologies has been expanded and the types of disruption have bee re-
categorized by other researchers. For example, Utterback and Acee (2005) have drawn a 
map of possible competitive advantages due to technological changes using the three 
parameters “cost, traditional performance, and ancillary performance” derived from 
disruptive theory. Similarly, in their recent work published by the Journal of Product 
Innovation Management, Schmidt and Druehl (2008) offer new terminology and a 
framework to differentiate different types of disruptions. Focusing on diffusion types, they 
divide “new-market disruptions” into “fringe-market low-end encroachment” where 
customer preferences are incrementally different from those on the low end of the current 
market, and “detached-market low-end encroachment”, where the customer preferences 
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are dramatically different from those on the low-end of current market. In the same 
fashion, the substitute for “low-end disruptions” is “immediate low-end encroachment”, 
where encroachment starts immediately in the low end of the current market. 
 
Research in disruptive technology has brought forward a common pattern characterized by 
providing new features that are favored by a few new and uncompetitive markets but, at 
the same time, neglected by the dominant customers who always value improvement 
along the mainstream dimensions. Based on the literature review of disruptive technology, 
product attributes are basically analyzed from two dimensions: one representing 
traditional performance, appreciated by existing customers, and the other representing 
ancillary features, unvalued by existing customers. Different phrases are used to describe 
these two dimensions: “traditional attributes and secondary attributes” Schmidt (2004); 
“traditional performance and ancillary performance” (Utterback and Acee 2005); and 
“mainstream dimensions and niche dimensions” (Adner, 2002; Govindarajan and Kopalle, 
2006; Tellis, 2006). However, no specific, concrete definitions are provided and most of 
the terminologies are based on the customer’s perspective rather than the product’s.  
 
2.2.3   Discontinuous Innovation and Established Incumbents 
In the flood of continuous and discontinuous innovations, performances from well-
established incumbents and new entrants vary due to their different company-specific 
resources and competency sets. Numerous studies have been done and significant progress 
has been achieved on how and why established companies always face greater difficulties 
in adjusting to discontinuous innovations (e.g. Abernathy and Utterback, 1978; Henderson 
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and Clark, 1990; Tushman and Anderson, 1986; Anderson and Tushman, 1990; Leonard-
Barton, 1992; Christensen and Rosenbloom, 1995; Christensen, 1997). Established 
companies have well-developed systems for supporting ideas to invest in technologies, or 
the embodiment of these technologies, along the direction that their existing customers 
appreciate; killing these divert from traditional technological paradigms and existing 
customers’ preferences (Henderson & Clark, 1990). Path dependency simultaneously 
enhances and inhibits innovation, especially for established incumbents (Leonard-Barton, 
1992). When the paradigm changes, it is difficult for established companies, who are 
bounded by traditions, existing technological paths, sunk costs and internal political 
constraints, to recognize the shifts and acquire new knowledge to adapt to the increased 
uncertainty and environment turbulence (Tilton, 1971; Hannan and Freeman, 1977; 
Tushman and Anderson, 1986). Discontinuous innovations may disrupt the usefulness of 
the original infrastructure, information filters, communication channels and information-
processing structures that embody old architectural knowledge, thereby eliminating the 
advantages that established companies have over new entrants (Astley, 1985; Abernathy 
and Clark, 1985). Meanwhile, new entrants regard this kind of change as a new 
opportunity to open up new markets or potential applications. With a smaller size, shorter 
(path-dependent) histories and fewer commitments to the old value networks, new entrants 
are better suited to develop and commercialize emerging technologies and are able to enter 
previously impenetrable markets by exploiting these fundamentally different skills (Tilton, 
1971; Hannan and Freeman, 1977; Astley, 1985; Abernathy and Clark, 1985; Henderson 
and Clark, 1990; Christensen, 1997).  
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Tushman and Anderson (1986) used longitudinal data from three diverse industries 
(airlines, cement and minicomputers) to test their proposition that technology evolves 
through periods of incremental change punctuated by technological breakthroughs (either 
competencies-enhancing discontinuity or competencies-destroying discontinuity). 
Innovations which significantly advance the technological frontier through new and 
competency-destroying knowledge or skills are more likely to be initiated by new entrants. 
In contrast, the liabilities of age and tradition plague established incumbents when 
confronting competency-destroying innovations. The most vivid examples took place in 
the minicomputer industry. When the technology evolved from vacuum tubes and 
transistors to integrated circuits and semiconductor memory, “only the few firms explicitly 
founded to make minicomputers were able to make the transition. By 1965, almost every 
firm that produced early minicomputers had exited the product class.” (Tushman and 
Anderson, 1986, pp461) Although different terminologies have been adopted, in our 
analysis, competency-destroying innovation falls into the category of discontinuous 
innovation, as it is appreciated by new entrants rather than established incumbents. 
 
Christensen’s two bestselling books, “The Innovator’s Dilemma” and “The Innovator’s 
Solution”, mention many well-known examples of established incumbents’ failures when 
faced with discontinuous innovation. In the hard disk drive industry, where Christensen 
did a longitudinal in-depth study over a 17-year history, this pattern consistently repeated 
itself: new entrants like Shugart Associates, Micropolis, Priam and Quantum introduced 8-
inch drives and invaded the market previously dominated by 14-inch drives; Seagate 
Technology pioneered the new application of 5.35-inch disk drives and wiped 8-inch 
drives out of the minicomputer market; Rodime, a Scottish entrant, developed the 3.5-inch 
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drive which grew strongly competitive in the emerging portable computer market and 
attacked the mainstream 5.35-inch market; and most recently, new entrants like Longmont, 
Colorado and Prairietek announced the arrival of 2.5-inch drives. Similarly, there are 
several good examples from other industries. In telecommunications, Cisco, a new entrant 
with packet-switching technology, disrupted the industry leaders such as Lucent, Siemens 
and Nortel who were using circuit-switching technology. In the steel milling industry, 
mini-mills successfully attacked the established integrated steel companies. In the 
mechanical excavators industry, new entrants with hydraulic excavators took over the 
general excavation contracting market. In the photocopier market, Canon and Ricoh 
introduced low-speed, poor-resolution desktop photocopiers to compete with market 
leader Xerox’s high-speed machine. Finally, in the electronics industry, large TV and 
radio manufacturers pushed vacuum tube technology as their dominate design for its high 
sound fidelity, but Sony captured their dominance with low sound fidelity transistor 
technology (Christensen and Raynor, 2003). To sum up, all of these industrial examples 
illustrate established incumbents’ declining performance when confronted by innovations 
caused by disruptive technology. In our analysis, these innovations are important types of 
discontinuous innovations.  
 
2.2.4   Expanded View of Discontinuous Innovation and Established 
Incumbents 
Several counterexamples do exist that demonstrate how established companies are still 
capable of either recapturing their previous market or technological position or remaining 
industry leaders while discontinuous innovations occur (Ahuja and Lampert, 2001; Methe, 
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Swaminathan, Mitchell and Toyama, 1997; Tripsas, 1997; Rosenbloom and Christensen, 
1998; Rothaermel, 2001).  
 
Most of these examples take different organizational strategies or approaches, either 
splitting up an autonomous unit to develop new processes and values within it or creating 
an independent organization whose processes and technologies are a close match with the 
new value network through acquisition (Christensen, 1997). Macher (2004) has illustrated 
these organizational approaches with three empirical studies in the telecommunications, 
computing and imaging industries. Motorola, IBM and Kodak, each one the established 
incumbent in their industry, were able to gain profits from disruptive technologies in 
emerging markets either through either internal ventures or joint ventures. These 
autonomous actions imply the importance of open culture, a robust internal ecology and 
organic organizational structures (Burgelman, 1994), which are more likely to be 
accumulated from experiences in instable environments (Burns & Stalker, 1961). Earlier 
in their work, Barney (1991) and Hill and Rothaermel (2003) mentioned the importance of 
experience through unique historical events and environment turbulence. Therefore, 
learning lessons from unique historical conditions and environment turbulence is a crucial 
type of competency in order for incumbents to sustain competitive performance in the face 
of discontinuous innovation.   
 
Several researchers (e.g. Peters, 1996; Tripsas, 1997) have argued that cooperation 
between established companies and new entrants is an important mechanism for 
incumbents to adapt to discontinuous technological change through the combination of the 
new entrants’ competencies in exploring new technologies and the established 
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incumbents’ competencies in exploiting complementary assets, e.g. specialized 
manufacturing capability, access to distribution channels, service networks and 
complementary technologies (Peters, 1996; Tripsas, 1997). Strategic alliances between 
incumbents and new entrants can be established to fulfill incumbents’ specific knowledge 
and skill requirements for divergent technologies and discontinuous product development 
(Ding and Peters, 2000). In order to gain the competencies that lay beyond incumbents’ 
existing boundaries and experiences, they embark on “short-term relationships, or 
dalliances, with new and unfamiliar suppliers” (Phillips, Lamming, Bessant and Noke, 
2006). Phillips, Lamming, Bessant and Noke (2006) drew this conclusion based on their 
work on supplier relationships and discontinuous innovation, as well as from a 15-month 
empirical study of UK companies from a variety of business sectors. While new and small 
entrants provide emerging technologies in these technical alliances, incumbents provide 
their complementary assets to facilitate the commercialization process (Tripsas, 1997; 
Rothaermel, 2001). Regardless whether the technological innovation is continuous or 
discontinuous in nature, incumbents’ ownership of complementary assets can benefit the 
manufacturing and marketing process (Teece, 1986). For example, unique insights about 
customer needs and the application of technologies are usually accrued through unique 
historical events experienced by incumbents. When the technologies are generally 
available, the key technique lies in grabbing new market opportunities (Abernathy and 
Clark, 1985). Through their studies of biotechnology and typesetter industries, Tripsas 
(1997) and Rothaermel (2001) provided concrete evidence that incumbents’ exploitation 
of complementary assets can prevent them from suffering due to an inferior technology 
position. Therefore, the competencies of inter-firm collaboration, marketing and 
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incorporating internal complementary knowledge play critical roles in incumbents’ 
survival in the face of discontinuous innovation. 
 
Apart from autonomous organizational entities and collaborative relations, some scholars 
try to break the paradox of “capability-rigidity” (Leonard-Barton, 1992) by experimenting 
with and intimating technologies that companies lack prior experience in, have newly 
developed or cannot achieve by simply extending their existing technologies (Ahuja and 
Lampert, 2001). Developing technological competencies in multiple directions may be 
critical for incumbents to create discontinuous innovation. However, the process of how to 
support and mold efforts to this kind of technological competency is still regarded as a 
black-box (Teece, 1997; Eisenhardt, 2000; Nelson and Nelson, 2002).  
 
Based on the previous literature, we have identified several competencies from the 
proposed strategies for incumbents’ survival in the face of discontinuous innovation. 
These competencies include persistent market competencies of shedding unique insights 
about customer needs or identifying a new market (Abernathy and Clark, 1985), inter-firm 
collaborative relationships with technology providers (Mitchell and Singh, 1996, and 
Rothaermel, 2001), incorporating internal complementary knowledge (Tripsas, 1997), 
learning from unique historical conditions and environment turbulence (Barney, 1991; 
Hill, 2003) and developing diversified technologies (Ahuja and Lampert, 2001). 
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2.3   Company Competency: A Resource-Based View 
We regard these competencies as the companies’ heterogeneous resources that have been 
accumulated through their idiosyncratic history and difficult for others to emulate, which 
exactly fits the assumptions of the theory of a resource-based view. Therefore, analyzing 
the company-specific competencies from a resource-based view is appropriate and may 
shed unexpected light on how incumbents deal with discontinuous innovations.  
 
2.3.1   A Resource-Based View 
From the firm’s perspective, resources and products are two sides of the same coin and 
this is reflected in the literature on strategic management. The traditional concept of 
strategy is actually resource-based, phrased as strength or a weakness (Andrews, 1971). 
Unlike the analysis of a product or the external competitive environment, the analysis of 
the impact of idiosyncratic firm attributes on a firm’s competitive position relies on two 
specific assumptions. First, it assumes that firms within an industry are heterogeneous in 
terms of the strategic resources they control. Second, it assumes that these resources are 
not perfectly mobile across firms, thus heterogeneity can be long-lasting (Barney, 1991). 
Throughout history, firms have accumulated their unique resource sets and different 
intangible organizational assets. These assets, which result from unique historical 
conditions, are ambiguous and socially complex. (Tyler, 2001)   
 
Firm resources, in the language of traditional strategic analysis, are equivalent to firm 
strengths which can be used to conceive of and implement strategies (Learned, 
Christensen, Andrews and Guth, 1969; Porter, 1981). The idea of looking at a firm as a set 
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of broader resources, beyond the confined boundaries of labor, capital and land, goes back 
to the seminal work of Penrose (1959). Yet, due to its unpleasant properties for modeling 
purposes, little formal attention has been paid to those works with the exception of Rubin 
(1973).  A more comprehensive concept proposed by Daft (1983), defines firm resources 
as all assets, capabilities, organizational processes, information, knowledge, firm attributes, 
etc. controlled by a firm. There are numerous possible firm resources: brand name, in-
house knowledge of technology, employment of skillful personnel, trade contact, 
machinery, efficient procedure, capital and so on (Wernerfelt, 1984).  
 
The heterogeneity of capabilities and resources in a population of firms is one of the 
cornerstones of resource-based theory (Peteraf, 1993; Hoopes, Madsen, and Walker, 2003). 
Since Barney (1986a, 1986b, 1991) and Wernerfelt (1984) published their original papers 
on the resource-based view, and Teece (1997), later on, proposed his dynamic capability 
theory to supplement the resource-based view on a dynamic premise, a distinction 
between resources and capability has emerged. “A resource is identified as an observable 
(but not necessarily tangible) asset that can be valued and traded, such as a brand, a patent, 
a parcel of land, or a license. A capability, on the other hand, is not observable (and hence 
necessarily intangible) and cannot be valued and traded.” (Hoopes, Madsen and Walker, 
2003, pp890) Based on Teece’s (1997) definition, capability represents a firm’s ability to 
integrate, build and reconfigure internal and external competences to address rapidly 
changing environments. Herein, our focus is not on the dynamic process by which 
resources are developed and adjusted in order to sustain a competitive advantage in a 
changing environment. Rather, we use capabilities to represent all assets and resources at 
the company level. Tyler (2001) differentiated competency from capability by defining it 
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as the resources and assets surpassing those of most competing companies, a subset of 
capability. Also, in order not to confuse readers about the analysis of company level and 
product level, we respectively use competency for company and capability for product. 
 
2.3.2   Classification of Company Competencies 
Most of the competencies mentioned above that help incumbents successfully survive 
when faced with discontinuous innovations, e.g. market competencies, inter-firm 
collaborative relationships, incorporating internal complementary knowledge and learning 
from unique historical conditions and environment turbulence, are a subset of the 
organizational and strategic routines embedded in the organization (Eisenhardt, 2000). 
These routines refer to a firm’s abilities to integrate, coordinate or synthesize internal and 
external resources. In contrast, developing diversified technologies is categorized as a 
technological competency, mainly defined as the in-house knowledge of technology. 
Although technological competencies represent an important source of competitive 
advantage in technologically competitive markets (Hofer and Schendel, 1978; Wernerfelt, 
1984; Carey, 1992; Nelson, 1991), not all firms with advanced technological 
competencies have super performances (Teece, 1986; Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997), 
and cultivating a competitive advantage doesn’t necessarily mean outspending rivals on 
R&D (Prahalad, and Hamel, 1990).  
 
The competencies needed to integrate, coordinate or synthesize internal and external 
resources are increasingly being used by academics to explain the differences in 
competitive advantage and performance between firms (e.g. Jones and George, 1998). 
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Similar ideas can be seen in the work of Kogut and Zander (1992). They use the term 
“combinative capabilities” to describe firm’s capabilities which “rest in the organizing 
principles by which relationships among individuals, within and between groups, and 
among organizations are structured” (Kogut and Zander, 1992, pp384). Nelson and 
Sampat (2001) have developed another mechanism to differentiate between organizational 
and strategic routines and in-house technological know-how. The former one is called 
“social technology”, also known as “institutions”, and represents the mode of coordination, 
while the latter competency is labeled “physical technology”. Herein, we adopt the 
terminology “cooperative competencies”, coined by Tyler (2001), to relate to successful 
cooperation within and between firms thus allowing them to fully exploit their technical 
competencies.  
 
In particular, of the competencies discussed in the above section on the “expanded view of 
established incumbents and discontinuous innovation”, market competencies (Abernathy 
and Clark, 1985), inter-firm collaborative relationships with technology providers 
(Mitchell and Singh, 1996, and Rothaermel, 2001), incorporating internal complementary 
knowledge (Tripsas, 1997) and learning from unique historical conditions and 
environment turbulence (Barney, 1991; Hill, 2003) can be grouped into the category of 
cooperative competencies while developing diversified technologies (Ahuja and Lampert, 
2001) can be labeled as technological competencies, referring to the in-house knowledge 
of technology. Market competencies and inter-firm collaborative relationships represent a 
company’s competencies in external resource exploration and utilization, e.g. customers, 
social environment, components makers, external complementary technology providers, 
etc. On the other hand, incorporating internal complementary knowledge and learning 
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from unique historical conditions and environment turbulence are the indicators for 
internal resource exploration and utilization, e.g. internal complementary technology 
providers, previous generations, organizational culture, etc. The definition for each 
competency is summarized in Table 2.1. 
 
Table 2.1 Definitions of company competencies 
Competency Definition 
Market competencies 
Company’s ability in discovering the changes in customers needs, the 
opportunities of a new market or the changes in social environment 
Collaborative relations 
Company’s ability in utilizing the technologies and ideas provided by 
other companies, e.g. component makers, suppliers.   
Incorporating internal 
complementary knowledge 
Company’s ability in integrating knowledge from internal 
complementary technology providers 
Learning from unique 
historical conditions and 
environment turbulence 
Company’s ability in benefiting from previous successful and failed 
experiences, including the organizational culture. 
                                                                      
2.4   Conclusion 
After reviewing the literature in technological innovation as well as the basic theories of 
the resource-based view, we have gained an understanding of the reasons why incumbents 
usually face greater difficulties when confronted with discontinuous innovations. We have 
also identified the necessary competencies that help incumbents adopt useful strategies to 
make full use of their advantages as incumbents and overcome their weak positions in 
emerging technologies. However, whether established incumbents can create 
discontinuous innovations, especially when they are technologically inferior to their peers 
and if these competencies can be turned from passive solutions into active drivers are still 
unresolved questions for us.  
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On the other hand, company competencies and capabilities have been regarded as a black 
box for a long time and opening this black box, in the broadest sense, has become an 
important topic, evident by a recent call from the Organization Science Winter Conference 
to be held in 2009 (Colorado, February 3-8, 2009). Following this, our interest is to 
understand any company competencies that can contribute to the creation of discontinuous 
innovation by incumbents. 
 
Based on the discussions above, our research questions are phrased as below:  
 
• How do “inferior-technology” incumbents win over their “superior-
technology” competitors through discontinuous innovation? 
• What kinds of competencies are needed for established incumbents to create 
discontinuous innovation when they are technologically inferior to their peers?  
 
We try to address these questions from a resource-based view that regards these 
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Chapter 3    Research Methodology  
 
3.1   Introduction 
In this chapter we explain our choice of research methodology. Case study is a primary 
candidate for research on discontinuous innovation because such work can provide critical 
insights and lay a foundation for further research (Veryzer, 1998). Careful study of a 
single case may lead researchers to see new theoretical relationships. This fits well with 
our research objective to unravel the process of established incumbents initiating 
discontinuous innovations. We begin this chapter with a brief introduction to the different 
types of research methodologies followed by the concrete reasons why we selected case 
study as our major research strategy in this particular context. We will end this chapter 
with a brief description of the case study protocol, illustrating the flow of our data 
collection. 
 
3.2   Overview of Research Methodologies 
There are various classifications of research methods. Over the past few decades the 
dominant research methodology has been rationalism. Rationalism is concerned with 
explaining what happens and how, in order to achieve some goal or end. According to 
rationalism, the relationships and observations are considered to be independent of the 
theories. On the other hand, a case/field study takes an alternative research approach, 
known as interpretivism. This approach uses multiple tools to collect data from 
observations and communications in a single, natural setting that considers the temporal 
and contextual aspects of the contemporary phenomenon under study, but without 
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experimental controls or manipulations. It focuses more on process or means and helps the 
researcher comprehend why certain characteristics or effects occur or not (Meredith, 
1998). 
 
Another classification of research methodology is qualitative versus quantitative, 
depending on whether the data is textual or numerical. For a qualitative study, six features 
are outlined (Eisner, 1991): 
1) Field focused. The investigators usually go out into the field, observe and talk with 
their research objectives. 
2) Subjective perception. It is not a matter of checking behaviours, but rather of engaging 
the investigator in the situation, making sense of it, perceiving the presence and 
interpreting the significance. 
3) Interpretive character. Qualitative inquirers aim to uncover the meaning of the event 
for those who experience it, beneath the manifest behaviour. 
4) The use of expressive language and the presence of a voice in the text. 
5) Attention to the particulars. 
6) Coherence, insight and instrumental utility. Criteria for judging the contributions of 
the qualitative research are needed. 
 
Following this classification, Figure 3.1 graphically summarizes the two major branches 
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Figure 3.1 Classification of research methodologies 
 
3.3   Selection of Case Study 
As a research strategy, a case study focuses on an understanding of the dynamics present 
within single settings, typically combining data from archives, interviews, questionnaires 
and observations (Eisenhardt, 1989). The dynamics within a single setting are consistent 
with what Meredith (1998) has described as “a temporary, single and on-going 
background”.    
 
THE METHODOLOGY OF RESEARCH  
Qualitative research  
(Data: principally verbal) 
Quantitative research  









A compatibility procedure 
designed to reconcile the two 
major methodologies by 
eclectically using elements from 
each of the major methodologies as 
these contribute to the solution of 
the major problem 
Source: Adapted from Leedy, 1974 
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Three conditions are outlined to determine the different situations where each strategy 
should be used: a) the type of research question posed, b) the extent of control an 
investigator has over actual behavioral events and c) the degree of focus on contemporary 
rather than historical events. Based on these conditions, a case study is applied when 
“how” or “why” questions are being posted, when the investigator has little control over 
the events or when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life 
context (Yin, 1988). The table below explicitly displays the classification according to the 
conditions mentioned above. 
 
Table 3.1 Relevant situations for different research strategies 







Experiment how, why yes yes 
Survey 





Who, what, where, how many,             
how much 
no yes/no 
History how, why no no 
Case study how, why no yes 
 
 
As for our study of Nintendo’s Wii, three concrete reasons are stated below in terms of 
why the strategy of a single-case study was selected.  
 
Firstly, the purpose of this study is to unveil how “inferior-technology” incumbents win 
over their “superior-technology” competitors through discontinuous innovation. Solely 
Source: Adapted from Yin, 1988 
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depending on the data from the previous literature, common sense and experience have 
become less convincing as the academic world has advanced. It is an intimate connection 
with empirical reality that permits the development of a testable, relevant and valid theory 
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967). 
 
Secondly, as the bedrock axiom says, the nature of the data and the problem of the 
research dictate the research methodology. Besides the fact that one of our main research 
questions begins with “how”, another convincing rationale is that our data was principally 
collected from personal interviews and professional documentations expressed both 
verbally and literally. These two features lead to the adoption of the case study as our 
research method. 
 
Lastly, Dyer and Wilkins (1991) argue that the careful study of a single case can lead 
researchers to see new theoretical relationships. They objected to Eisenhardt’s point of 
view that focused on comparisons within the same organizational context. Furthermore, 
they displayed the trade-off between the deep understanding of a particular social setting 
and the benefits of comparative insights. Since our aim is to unveil the process of 
innovation creation and to describe it as richly as possible, involving too many cases may 
distort the picture or lead the investigator to draw superficial conclusions. Thus, we have 
selected a single-case study as our main approach.  
 
In summary, a single-case study is the most appropriate research method to fulfill our 
research objectives given the nature of our data.  However, our work will not be isolated 
to just the study of the Wii as a single product case. We will make proper comparisons 
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with Nintendo's competitors and also with the Wii's predecessors in the home video game 
console industry to help us gain a wider understanding and generate more insightful ideas. 
 
3.4   Case Study Protocol 
 
3.4.1   Case Study Overview 
A living case in the video game console industry is selected as our primary study unit. 
Over the past two decades, the video game industry has grown into a sizable industry with 
annual sales that rival box office receipts for the movie industry. Nintendo, as a major 
incumbent in this industry, successfully shifts from the traditional path where innovation 
is towards “flashier and faster” products and won over its “super technological” 
competitors with its new generation game console the “Wii”. According to the comments 
of video game industry experts, the Wii is trying to reinstitute the benchmark in the video 
gaming market and to redefine the boundary of mainstream customers. Data collection 
was conducted immediately after the literature review. We sourced our information from 
the Internet, academic journals, industry magazines and business press news.1 We also 
paid greater attention to exclusive documentation for Nintendo as well as other documents 
for Sony and Microsoft, the other two major players in the video game industry. In order 
to have a basic understanding of Nintendo’s competencies and the Wii’s development 
processes we extracted the figures, facts and process descriptions from annual reports, 
interviews and internal discussions. 
 
 
1. At the early stage of the study, we approached the senior management of Nintendo for interviews. 
Unfortunately, this request was turned down by the company. 
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3.4.2   Research Design 
Nintendo publicized the Wii’s development process through various interviews and public 
reports. These rendered secondary data to sufficiently support our analysis in terms of 
depth and width. We also obtained some patent information from the United States Patents 
and Trademark Office (USPTO) website to supplement our analysis based on secondary 
interview sheets, expert reports and other documentation. Our data collection ranged from 
the industry level to the company level, and was eventually narrowed down to the product 
level.  
 
At the industry level, we collected data based on previous literature, professional industry 
reports produced by professional organizations (e.g. Entertainment Software Association, 
NPD groups and Famitsu (famitsu.com), a specialized Japanese video game magazine) 
and from Wikipedia.org, the biggest multilingual free-content encyclopedia on the Internet.  
 
At the company level, except for the same sources as the industry-level data collection 
mentioned above which provided the history and current status of the company, we 
carefully examined the internal interview archives posted on its official website named 
“Iwata Asks”. Based on these internal interview archives, we categorized the important 
statements according to the competencies identified by which are deduced from the 
previous literature review chapter. These competencies are market competencies, 
collaborative relations, incorporating internal complementary knowledge and learning 
from unique historical conditions and environment turbulence. Marketing competencies 
refer to Nintendo’s capability in discovering changes to customer needs and the 
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opportunities of a new market. Collaborative relations describe Nintendo’s competencies 
in utilizing the technologies and ideas provided by other companies within or beyond the 
video game industry, including cooperation with component makers, peripheral makers 
and third-party software developers. Incorporating internal complementary knowledge 
refers to Nintendo’s ability in incorporating the knowledge from internal software 
development groups into the hardware development process, reflected in the collaboration 
between hardware development groups and internal game design groups. Finally, the 
competencies of learning from unique historical conditions and environment turbulence 
refer to Nintendo’s ability to benefit from its successful and failed experiences with 
previous generations of game consoles as well as the organizational culture. We also 
extracted useful information from the USPTO website and related patent analysis software. 
 
At the product level, we first looked at the Wii’s development process, paying close 
attention to the design and development of the Wii Remote, the key to its success. Next, 
we deconstructed the Wii and its competing products according to Gavin’s framework 
(1987). Four critical dimensions best suited to our context are proposed: performance, 
features, aesthetics and perceived quality. The definition of each dimension is articulated 
in Table 3.2. In particular, the concepts “performance” and “features” have been explicitly 
shown to correspond with the two dimensions in the theory of disruptive technology from 
the product’s perspective. For example, in the automobile industry, primary performance 
includes traits like acceleration, handling, speed and comfort, or, for a television set, the 
primary performance refers to sound, graphics and the ability to receive signals from 
distant stations (Gavin, 1987). The quality of performance usually involves measurable 
attributes. The line separating primary performance characteristics from secondary 
Creating discontinuous innovation: the case of Nintendo’s Wii 
                                                                                                             - 42 -                                                                                                                         
    
features is often blurry. The quality of feature usually depends on objective individual 
needs. Data collection at this level is not only restricted to a single generation, but also 
involves comparisons with previous generations. 
 
Table 3.2 Four dimensions of product 
Differentiation  Definition 
Performance 
Primary operating characteristics, which differentiate one class of product from 
another.  
Features 
Secondary aspects of performance, the “bells and whistles” that supplement their 
basic functioning. 
Aesthetics How a product looks, feels, sounds, tastes, or smells  
Perceived 
Quality 
Consumers do not always have complete information about a product's or service's 
attributes; indirect measures may be their only basis for comparing: images, 
advertising, and brand names  
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Figure 3.2 Structure of data collection 
 
3.5   Conclusion 
In summary, after reviewing the various research methodologies, we selected a single-case 
study as our research methodology. This decision was based on the characteristics of our 
research questions and the creative and insightful theory we aimed to achieve. Finally, 
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Chapter 4    Data and Analysis 
 
4.1   Introduction 
As the main body of the thesis, this chapter displays the data we have collected, our 
analysis based on previous literature and the practical data. In order to provide a better 
understating of the context of our single case, we first introduce the background of the 
video game industry. This data is based on literature about the gaming industry and 
information from Nintendo’s official website and annual reports. The 2001 article titled 
Note on Home Video Game Technology and Industry Structure by Professor Coughlan 
from the Harvard Business School provides an excellent review of the industry’s 
components and structure. The historical overview is followed by a review of current 
status of the video game industry.  
 
At the company level, key products from Nintendo’s history are presented. This is then 
followed by Nintendo’s general innovation strategy and some management practices. This 
section ends with a comprehensive patent analysis based on the data collected from the 
United States Patents and Trademark Office (USPTO) website.  
 
At the product level, a brief introduction describing the Wii is presented. We subsequently 
introduce the Wii’s development process and product profile as well as its competing 
products, based on various secondary data sources.  
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4.2   Video Game Industry 
 
4.2.1   Video game industry structure 
The video game industry is often used as a typical example of network externality effects, 
where products must be connected in a network with complementary items to fully benefit 
the customers (Gallagher and Park, 2002). In general, a video game system consists of the 
game console (hardware), which also refers to the platform provider, and the game titles 
(software).  
 
The performance of game consoles are mainly measured by three basic technical factors: 
data width (in bits), clock speed (in MHz) and the amount of RAM (in bytes). Data width 
determines the size and complexity of the instructions that the CPU can process, clock 
speed is a measure of how many instructions can be processed per second and the amount 
of RAM acts as a temporary storage for the instructions to be kept in memory at any one 
time (Clements and Ohashi, 2005). 
 
Increasingly, software is playing a crucial role in determining the success of video game 
systems (Huffstutter, 1999). The development of game software depends on two major 
features, the format and the compatibility. The format of storage measures the capacity 
and speed for instruction processing. By the end of the 1990s, online capability had 
become another important format for video games. Good online capability depends on low 
latency, broad Internet bandwidth, cheap hardware prices and low Internet access costs. 
These elements are important for speedily delivering instructions and large graphic files 
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online, as well as for the gamers’ positive feelings about the attractiveness of playing the 
game online. For software, compatibility refers to whether the software is designed for a 
single video game system. In other word, it means that whether the software is 
incompatible with other competitive systems, or it can be played on multiple systems, like 
other video game consoles or altogether different platforms such as mobile phones and 
personal computers. When compatibility is applied to hardware, it refers to the backwards 
compatibility which enables the new machine to play the existing games designed for the 
manufacturer’s previous generation console.  
 
In total, there are six parties (hardware and software) who are involved in the value chain 
of the home video game industry: 
1) Content providers: the providers of the original ideas, names, characters, storylines 
and other intellectual content of games. They are usually licensed from other industries 
such as film, TV or cartoons. This licensed content helps software publishers 
differentiate their games in a crowed marketplace. 
2) Software developers: the creators of games and the core of the video game industry. 
They are either employed by console manufacturers (platform providers), separately 
employed by software publishers or independently run by themselves. As the 
complexity and the capability of the hardware technology greatly increase, as well as 
the gamers’ expectations, software development requires more complex programming 
abilities in order to develop game titles. Except for the programming ability, they also 
require stronger support and tools from the console manufacturers and building up 
larger development teams for game developing. 
3) Software publishers: the third-party publishers. They pay platform providers a royalty 
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fee for each copy of a game sold, which becomes a large part of platform providers’ 
revenue. 
4) Platform providers: the home video game console manufacturers. They perform three 
primary business activities: designing, manufacturing and marketing game consoles, 
developing and publishing game titles for game consoles and managing relationships 
with third-party software publishers. 
5) Retailers: the software or electronics specialty stores, toy stores, supermarkets and 
online stores. 
6) Consumers: the game players. They have different preferences among the large games 
library. While the historical target market for the home video game industry was 10-17 
year old boys, the proportions for females, adults and seniors have changed 
dramatically.  
Figure 4.1 illustrates the structure of home video game industry.  
 













Software Publishers Platform Providers 
Royalties 
   Source: Coughlan, 2001 
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4.2.2 History of Video Game Industry: 
Following Schilling (2003) and Gallagher and Park (2002), we view the history of video 
game industry comprising seven generations.  
 
Beginning of the video game era: the very first home video game system was Odyssey, 
introduced in 1972 by Magnavox. However, in the same year, Nolan Bushnell founded 
Atari and introduced “Pong”. This console and game proved to be much more successful 
and promoted video game systems as a vibrant and viable industry. There were lots of 
major players during that time, and there was no clear boundary to differentiate the first 
and second generations. The major players were Fairchild Channel F released by Fairchild 
Semiconductor, the Magnavox Odyssey2, the Game Vision produced by Texas Instrument, 
Intellivision released by Mattel, Atari 5200 and so on. Atari’s 1977 introduction of the 
Atari Video Computer System (VCS) dominated the market until Coleco released the 
Coleco Vision video game system in 1982.   
 
In the mid-1980s, profits for video game makers began to decline due to rapid 
proliferation and unauthorized games and the market was regarded as saturated. However, 
two new entrants from Japan instilled new energy to this dying industry and led to the 
beginning of modern video game combat. These two players were Nintendo and Sega. 
 
Third generation: the beginning of the modern video game industry is marked by video 
game history’s third generation. Nintendo dominated the market with the Nintendo 
Entertainment System (NES) and outsold Sega’s Master System and Atari’s 7800 in 8-bit 
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game consoles. Nintendo’s success lied in its high security and strictly exclusive licensing 
policy. A security chip was used to verify the authenticity of the compatible cartridges and 
a limited numbers of licensees were issued to develop the game titles. Furthermore, third-
party developers were prohibited from making the game available for any other competing 
system for two years. Nintendo also benefited from its intensive and efficient marketing 
and distributing management.  
 
Fourth generation: in order to destroy Nintendo’s predominance, Sega and NEC turned 
to substantial technological innovation. In 1989, Sega and NEC introduced their 16-bit 
consoles, Genesis and Turbo Grafix-16, respectively, representing the arrival of the fourth 
generation of video game consoles. Sega built up its momentum with better color, digital 
sound, popular game characters and fewer restrictive licensing arrangements with third-
party game developers. Although Nintendo finally introduced its own 16-bit Super 
Nintendo Entertainment System (SNES), it was too late to catch up with the Genesis in 
either the variety of game titles available or the number of hardware units sold. 
 
Fifth generation: the three major players of the fifth generation are Sony’s PlayStation, 
Sega’s Saturn and the Nintendo 64. Despite the entry of the fifth-generation consoles, 
Nintendo continued to develop popular game titles for its SNES by incorporating 
additional graphics abilities and it continued to outsell the more advanced fifth-
generationconsoles until Christmas 1996, making Nintendo a latecomer in the fifth-
generation console war. Thus, when the Nintendo 64 was eventually released, Sony had 
already established its installed base, a variety of compatible game titles and had 
reinstituted the dominant design by providing two new features, a high capacity CD drive 
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and optional memory cards that let gamers save a game in progress. Neither Sega nor 
Nintendo were able to reclaim their dominance over the video game industry. 
The CD-ROM had already become the dominant design in the market, and the Nintendo 
64 was the last mainstream home video game console to use cartridges as the medium to 
store its games. The limited storage capacity of cartridges constrained the development of 
a game’s content, putting off lots of players and game developers.  
 
Sixth generation: the sixth generation of consoles began when Sega introduced its 
Dreamcast system in 1999. Yet, due to intensive competition, Sega left the video console 
business in 2001 and began concentrating on software development for multiple platforms. 
This era also marked the entry of the software giant Microsoft into the industry, who 
intended to take a large share of this lucrative market with its personal computer 
technology. This generation was characterized as the era of the 128-bit console, and 
Sony's PlayStation 2 (PS2), Microsoft's Xbox and Nintendo's GameCube were the three 
dominant players. The success of the original PlayStation established a good image for 
Sony’s later products and the PlayStation 2 continued to dominate in this round, achieving 
a market share of 70%.  
 
Seventh generation: the beginning of the seventh generation of home consoles came on 
November, 2005 with the release of Microsoft’s Xbox 360 and continued a year later with 
the release of Sony’s PlayStation 3 and Nintendo’s Wii. Who will be the winner is still 
uncertain. 
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4.2.3   Statue quo of Video Game Industry 
Many professional gaming organizations conduct surveys and interviews of gamers and 
experts to study new trends in the video game industry. For instance, according to a 
survey conducted by Famitsu (famitsu.com), a popular Japanese gaming magazine, 
although an important trend in the video game industry is to evolve from 2D graphic to 3D 
graphic games, 2D games have not faded away as expected. Gamers comment that 2D 
games feel friendly opposed to 3D’s resemblance to reality. 2D still gets significant 
support in terms of more useful simplifications, e.g. a simpler representation, can often 
zoom out better, etc. Customers seem to have grown exhausted with the complex control 
systems and steep learning curve of certain video games, and the pendulum has swung to 
more enjoyable and easily playable games. 57.7% of respondents to the survey mentioned 
above prefer easy games to complex games. Although some of them admit that they enjoy 
the feeling of achievement when playing complex games with tricky gateways, the 
depression caused by the difficulties of complex games makes them still in favor of the 
easier ones. When playing a game, over 70% of respondents claim that they prefer relaxed 
and enjoyable styles rather than speedy and ambitious ones. These changes have also 
appeared in recent software development. Since the video game industry has grown from 
niche past-time to mass medium, companies that are making games more accessible are 
growing while those latched onto hard-core gamers have stagnated. Established software 
development companies have successively launched individual divisions for casual 
gamers, e.g. Electronic Arts, Ubisoft. (EGM: Electronic Gaming Monthly, September 
2007, No. 219).  
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As the video game industry continues to grow, the public perception of video games 
changes. As evident by statistics from the Entertainment Software Association, the 
demographic of the gaming population have changed: 35% of American parents say they 
play computer and video games. Further, 93% of gamer parents say they play video games 
with their kids and 66% feel that playing video games has brought their families closer 
together. More and more non-gamers have begun to appreciate the joy brought by playing 
video games: the percentage of senior players over the age of 50 has increased from 9% in 
1999 to 26% in 2007. Also, the gender/playing time gap has narrowed. In 2007 the 
average adult woman played video games for 7.4 hours per week and the average adult 
man played for 7.6 hours per week, while in 2004 males spent an average of 6 more 
minutes per day playing games than their female counterparts and, in 2003, they spent 18 
minutes more each day doing so.  
 
4.3   Nintendo 
 
4.3.1   Nintendo’s History 
Nintendo, one of the most powerful companies in the video game industry, has the 
distinction of historically being both the oldest intact company in the home video game 
market and one of the largest and well-known console manufacturers.  
 
Nintendo started as a small Japanese card company near the end of 1889. During its long 
history, Nintendo diversified into the transportation, hospitality, television, and toy 
industries. After it exited completely from the cards business, toy manufacturing activity 
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became the main focus. The experience gained from playing cards helped Nintendo 
survive in the competitive Japanese toy industry, but it still remained a small enterprise. 
 
Because of the short product life cycle for toys, the company had to constantly introduce 
new products. As their R&D department significantly grew, they employed opto-
electronics and introduced electronic technology into the toy industry for the first time in 
Japan. This established Nintendo’s solid foundation for the coming electronic era. 
 
Listed below are the key products that Nintendo developed after it became an important 
video game company, including the home video game console line and the portable 
hardware line. 
 
Color TV Game:  
 
Figure 4.2: Color TV Game 
                                   
 
In 1975 Nintendo cooperated with Mitsubishi Electric to develop the first video game 
system using an electronic video recording (EVR) player. 
Source:news.bbc.co.uk/nol/shared/spl/hi/pop_ups/07/technology_the_evolution_of_game_controllers/im
g/1.jpg 
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In 1977 Nintendo developed its first home video game machines, TV Game 15 and TV 
Game 6. They came as a single unit containing a single kind of game played in many 
different ways. Each of them was a success in Japan, paving the way for Nintendo's 
eventual dominance of the home videogame market with the home-based video game. 
 
Game & Watch:  
 
Figure 4.3: Game & Watch 
                                                    
 
In 1980 Nintendo of America Inc. in New York developed and started selling their GAME 
& WATCH product line. These were the first portable LCD video games with a 
microprocessor and are considered as the prototype of the Game Boy. The Game & Watch 
titles could run on a single watch battery and not only told the time, but also provided 
simple-yet-addictive gaming challenges.  
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Figure 4.4: Nintendo Entertainment System and Nintendo Family Computer 
      
 
In 1983 Nintendo released its 8-bit console Family Computer in Japan. Two years later the 
Nintendo Entertainment System (NES), the U.S version of the Family Computer System, 
was released in U.S. The NES game Super Mario Brothers became a smash hit around the 
world. NES was the most successful gaming console of its time in both Asia and North 
America. Its astounding graphics were far superior to any home-based console that came 
before it, and it went on to sell over 60 million units worldwide. The NES set the standard 
in subsequent console design from game development to controller layout. It was also the 
first console open to third-party developers.   
 
Game Boy:  
 
Figure 4.5: Game Boy 
Source: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NES 
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In 1989 Nintendo introduced the Game Boy, its first portable, hand-held game system 
with interchangeable games, in Japan and the U.S. It was the most successful video game 
system ever developed, evolving over the years with the Game Boy Pocket in 1996 and 
the Game Boy Color in 1998.  
 
Super Nintendo Entertainment System:  
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In 1990 Nintendo entered the 16-bit console market with the release of its Super Nintendo 
Entertainment System (SNES) in Japan and, one year later, in the U.S. The SNES featured 
true stereo sound, multiple scrolling backgrounds and almost twice the internal memory of 
its competitors.  
 
Nintendo 64:  
 
Figure 4.7: Nintendo 64 
                                       
                   
In 1996 Nintendo launched the Nintendo 64 in Japan and the U.S. The console featured 32 
bit and 64 bit data width, but the performance was no longer mainly dependent on this 
aspect. The N64 was Nintendo's first console designed to use 3D graphics technology and 
was also more powerful than any other console on the market at the time. However, 
Nintendo’s dominance in the video game industry was taken over by Sony in this 
generation with its PlayStation. According to the figures from the two companies’ official 
websites, 102.49 million units of PlayStation had been shipped out worldwide as of 31 
March, 2007, while the corresponding figure for N64 systems was just over 32 million. 
Source: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nintendo_64 
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Figure 4.8: GameCube 
                                         
 
In 2001 Nintendo introduced the GameCube, which was the first Nintendo console to use 
disc-based media. As the successor to the Nintendo 64, the Nintendo GameCube proved to 
be a failure. As of March 31, 2007, Nintendo had sold a total of 21.6 million Nintendo 
GameCube units worldwide, compared to 117.89 million PlayStation 2 units shipped and 
over 24 million Xbox units sold. 
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Figure 4.9: Game Boy Advance (GBA) 
                                       
 
In 2001 the Game Boy product line further evolved into the Game Boy Advance (GBA), 
boasting graphics and sound comparable to the Super NES. The GBA was also compatible 
with Game Boy and Game Boy Color games. This system underwent two revisions 
without changing its game-playing functionality: Game Boy Advance SP, which was the 
first Game Boy to include a back-lit screen and rechargeable battery, and an even smaller 
version called the Game Boy Micro, with a higher-quality back-lit screen.  
 
Nintendo DS:  
 
Figure 4.10: Nintendo DS 
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In 2004 the hand-held Nintendo DS, which opened up a new style of entertainment with 
its dual screens, touch control, wireless communication and voice recognition technology, 
was released in Japan and the U.S. Learning from Nintendo’s annual report 2006 & 2007, 
the Nintendo DS was the first tangible product that came from Nintendo’s new strategy 
“to expand gaming population regardless of their age, gender or cultural background”. In 
2006 the Nintendo DS Lite was launched, a smaller and lighter version of the Nintendo 
DS equipped with a brighter screen. The Nintendo DS and Nintendo DS Lite have sold 
40.3 million systems as of March 31, 2007, outselling its main rival the PlayStation 




Figure 4.11: Wii 
                                              
 
Under the working title of Revolution, Nintendo launched its new home video game 
console the Wii In 2006. Rather than simply following a traditional model of better 
Source: www.nintendo.com/wii 
Creating discontinuous innovation: the case of Nintendo’s Wii 
                                                                                                             - 61 -                                                                                                                         
    
graphics for same style games, the Wii provided many unique features besides the normal 
improvements to its predecessor.  
 
4.3.2   Nintendo’s Innovation 
Having experienced industry turbulence in the industry for two decades, Nintendo has 
developed a culture of constantly searching for something new, believing in the need to 
keep entertainment fresh and always having the ambition to do new things. According to a 
ranking of the top 30 innovations in the history of video game industry by Game Applied 
Technology, 2008 (Vol. 1, pp 48-51), only Nintendo is listed as the current major 
hardware manufacturer.  Nintendo was the first manufacturer who designed a controller 
with an Analog Stick and this was applied in its third home video game console, the 
Nintendo 64, for both North American and international markets. Nintendo invented the 
Battery Back-up Save System which was first offered on its exclusive game title the 
“Legend of Zelda” on NES. The Wii Remote’s three-axis motion signal-processing 
technology is also included in the Top 30 as the newest invention. It is the only 
technology included from the “next-generation” of video game consoles. According to the 
article “As Gaming Turns Social, Industry Shifts Strategies” in New York Time (February 
28, 2008), Nintendo’s advertisement activities for the Wii vividly illustrate the company’s 
innovation strategy. Unlike normal video game advertisements which just show the 
content of the games, Nintendo’s advertisements for the Wii are shot from the perspective 
of players’ backs to emphasize the movement of players. 
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Inspired by both their successes and failures from previous generations of home consoles 
and the portable game machines, Nintendo has started to pursue a new innovation path 
that aims for superior accessibility rather than high-technology performance. Nintendo has 
taken an important lesson from the worldwide success and spread of the NES: it is so 
easily operated that everyone can play. “In the end, our premise was to make a design 
that’s accessible to everyone. Only then will we be able to introduce people to a variety of 
software,” said Mr. Shigeru Miyamoto, the legendary designer of Nintendo regarded as 
the “father of modern video gaming”, who played a decisive role in determining the path 
of Nintendo's future development. Following this lesson from the NES, the Wii was born 
as “a design accessible for everyone”. This strategy is also supported by Nintendo’s 
market observations. The general public seems to be unable to differentiate between the 
graphical powers of the GameCube and PlayStation2 on one hand, and the Nintendo64 
and PlayStation on the other. This implies that the improvement of video game technology 
along the primary performance dimensions, e.g. processing speed and graphics, have 
already exceeded the customers’ demand. Mr. Satoru Iwata, CEO of Nintendo mentioned 
this viewpoint in Nintendo’s FY2008 Mid-term Financial Results Briefing when 
answering the question of how Nintendo was capable of developing machines with such a 
good balance between hardware and software. In fact, this point has been repeatedly 
mentioned. In the “Iwata Asks” internal interviews, which we introduced before as our 
major data source, Iwata said “Conventional path would eventually lead to a battle of 
sheer brute force with competitors and fewer and fewer consumers would able to keep up”. 
Mr Takeda, the General Manager of Integrated Research and Development Division who 
oversaw and coordinated the whole Wii project, also expressed the same view: “if we had 
followed the existing roadmaps we would have aimed to make it ‘faster and flashier.’” 
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However, early in the Wii project, “we came to realize the sheer inefficiency of this path 
when we compared the hardships and costs of development against any new experiences 
that might be had by our customers.”  
 
One possible driver for Nintendo’s pursuit of this innovation path is its “software-driven” 
mindset. “I’ve never encountered ID (Industry Design) so closely connected to software 
until I started at Nintendo,” Said Kenichiro Ashida, who was in charge of designing the 
controller and the console. This statement clearly demonstrates the contribution of the 
software team during the process of hardware development. In contrast, both Sony and 
Microsoft rely mainly on third-party developers and have less than 10% of first-party 
development (vgchartz.com). Nintendo is able to enjoy the advantages of its 20-year 
history of acclaimed performances in software development. Since the NES, over 50% of 
the million-seller titles for each generation were published by Nintendo itself and over 
40% million-seller titles for the Wii were developed by Nintendo. Intense cooperation 
with software developers during hardware development, both internally and externally, 
helps the hardware people see the urgent call for new ideas to attract the public and the 
constant conflict that game designers face: to make games simple and easily 
understandable or to make them complex and challenging. This dilemma is evident by 
statements from a professional gaming magazine, “Sometimes, when you have a team as 
big as the one working on Halo series, it’s hard to have same flexibility and agility that 
you would have with small teams. And there is a lot of the fun in that flexibility.” (EGM: 
Electronic Gaming Monthly, September 2007, No. 219, pp16). The software people not 
only provide insightful ideas and hints for hardware development, but also make 
significant contributions to hardware sales. The Nintendo CEO has said that the “video 
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game hardware business is the business of momentum, so you must achieve a high volume 
of sales at launch…Wii has to rely upon its first-party titles to create launch momentum”.  
 
4.3.3   Patent Analysis of Nintendo and Its Competitors 
Except for the qualitative data, we extract evidence from patents document as supporting 
material to demonstrate Nintendo’s technological competencies, comparing with Sony and 
Microsoft. The patent search is based on the USPTO website, covering the entire database 
from 1970 to the present, using “game console” as key words in all fields and Nintendo, 
Sony or Microsoft as the “Assignee Name”. 83 results are obtained for Nintendo, 61 for 
Sony and 165 for Microsoft. The earliest Nintendo patent we found was issued in 1991, 
while the earliest ones for Sony and Microsoft were issued in 2000 and 1998 respectively. 
The patent analysis tool PatentGuider 2.02 was used to identify the key classes involved 
and other related patent information, e.g. patent age, citation, etc. Generally, Nintendo has 
the largest self forwards citation number, the longest active years and the longest average 
patent age, as shown in Table 4.1. Although Nintendo’s strengths in the number of 
citations, active years and patent age may be attributed to its longer existence in the video 
game industry than either Sony or Microsoft, after we normalize the number by dividing 
the year distance between the earliest and the latest patent, Nintendo still enjoys 





2: PatentGuider is a useful software tool to conduct an analysis on industry patent information.  It can 
access to the world’s major patent databases and provides a user-friendly search interface. See 
http://www.ltc.tw/products/pg/pg.aspx for more information (in traditional Chinese). 
 
3: Nintendo and Sony file their patents under different assignee names, while all the patents for Microsoft 
are filed under the assignee name of “Microsoft Corporation “ 
 
4: “Average” for “Self citation”, “citation (others)”, and “overall citation” indicates the total number 
divided by the number of years. For instance, the average self citation rate for Nintendo is 140/18 (Year 
1991-Year 2008) = 0.23. 
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Nintendo Co., Ltd. 11 8 140 2 142 
Nintendo of America, Inc. 7 10 0 2 2 
Nintendo Software 
Technology Corporation 
1 9 0 0 0 
Total 19 27 140 4 144 
Nintendo 
Average4 / / 7.78 0.22 8 
Sony Computer 
Entertainment America, Inc. 
8 5 0 0 0 
Sony Computer 
Entertainment America, Inc. 
Co 
7 6 2 1 3 
Sony Corporation 7 6 0 1 1 
Sony Corporation of 
America 
1 8 0 0 0 
Sony Electronics, Inc. 6 6 0 1 1 
Sony Ericsson Mobile 
Communications AB 
1 4 0 0 0 
Sony Europa B.V. 2 9 0 0 0 
Total 32 44 2 3 5 
Sony 
Average / / 0.22 0.33 0.55 
Microsoft Corporation 10 5 21 1 22 
Microsoft 
Average / / 1.91 0.09 2 
 
Next, we analyze the patent class of the three companies. Figure 4.12 shows the number of 
patents in each class when we use “game console” and the company name, e.g. Nintendo, 
Sony, Microsoft as the key words. The horizontal axis represents the types of the patent 
classes and the vertical axis represents the number of patents. The definitions of all these 
classes in the part of “patent analysis of Nintendo and its competitors” are indicated in 
Appendix A. In the search of “game console” and Nintendo, key classes are identified 
around Class 345 (relating to computer graphics processing) and Class 463 (including 
means for processing electronic data in video game). While Class 345 and Class 463 are 
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UPC patent class analysis charts: Nintendo-PatentGuider2.0-[UPC analysis] 
also identified as key classes for Sony, the types of sub-classes are completely different. In 
Class 345, Sony not only has a number of patents related to graphics processing, but its 
patents also cover display peripheral interface input devices, which permit an operator to 
selectively control a display device in some manner, e.g. positioning a cursor. Except for 
Classes 345 and 463, the patents collected for “game console” and Sony have a broad 
coverage of other electriconic domains, such as television (generating, processing, 
transmitting or transiently displaying a sequence of images). For Microsoft, we didn’t see 
Class 463 as one of the key classes. However, more electric data processing related classes 
are included. The US class beginning with the number “7” mostly corresponds to Class 
“G06F” in International Patent Classification system (IPC).  
 
Figure 4.12  US Patent Class for three companies (“game console” & company name) 
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UPC patent class analysis charts: Sony-PatentGuider2.0-[UPC analysis] 
UPC patent class analysis charts: Microsoft-PatentGuider2.0-[UPC analysis] 
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In addition to searching patents by using “game console” and the company names of 
Nintendo, Sony and Microsoft as the key words, we further examine the classes and the 
number distributions in a broader context by searching only for “game console” as the key 
words. According to the evolution of game consoles ( Schiling, 2003; Gallagher and Park, 
2002; Clements and Ohashi, 2005), we classify the time frame into five periods: Period 1 
from 1983 to 1989, Period 2 from 1990 to 1995, Period 3 from 1996 to 2000, Period 4 
from 2001 to 2005 and Period 5 from 2006 to the present. Each period begins with the 
year that Nintendo launches their new home video game console. The companies with the 
highest patent number are shown in Figure 4.13.  
 
Figure 4.13 Patent No. of competitive companies  

















Sitric;David H US Philips Corporation Hayford, Jr.; Robert L. Atari, Inc
Sitric;David H 0 2 0 0 0
US Philips Corporation 2 0 0 0 0
Hayford, Jr.; Robert L. 0 0 1 0 1
Atari, Inc 1 3 0 0 0
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Coastal Amusement Distributors, Inc. Bahlijanakis; Micheal




0 0 0 0 1
Bahlijanakis; Micheal 0 0 0 1 0
Myson Technology, Inc. 0 0 1 0 0
Wells; James M. 0 1 1 0 0
Nintendo 1 0 1 0 0
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
 



















RIL Acquistion, Inc. United Microelectronics Corporation
Sega of America, Inc. Nintendo Co., Ltd
Immersion Human Interface Corporation
RIL Acquistion, Inc. 0 0 1 2 1
United Microelectronics
Corporation
0 1 5 0 0
Sega of America, Inc. 1 1 3 1 1
Nintendo Co., Ltd 0 4 0 1 5
Immersion Human Interface 0 1 1 3 11
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
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Sun Microsystems Inc. Sony Corporation Microsoft Corporation Immersion Corporation Nintendo Co., Ltd
Sun Microsystems Inc. 0 4 4 2 2
Sony Corporation 2 1 3 11 8
Microsoft Corporation 0 2 5 11 19
Immersion Corporation 13 9 5 13 9
Nintendo Co., Ltd 5 13 13 11 11
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
 



















Nintendo Co., Ltd Immersion Medical, Inc Sony Corporation NVIDIA Corporation Microsoft Corporation
Nintendo Co., Ltd 9 8 3
Immersion Medical, Inc 16 14 3
Sony Corporation 13 14 8
NVIDIA Corporation 33 29 30
Microsoft Corporation 46 48 33
2006 2007 2008
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Based on Figure 4.13, we see that in the first two periods, which represent the beginning 
of the modern video game era, there are no obvious technology leaders and the four 
companies differ greatly from Period 1 to Period 2. We haven’t found the leading 
companies in Period 1 to have any patents after 1986, thus, we presented the patent 
numbers from 1981-1985 in the first chart. Similarly, in Period 2, no leading companies 
have patents in 1990. Nintendo has been listed as one of the top companies since Period 2, 
slightly behind Wells in Period 2 and Immersion in Period 3. Although the companies 
with the highest patent numbers vary from period to period, the variety seems to decrease 
as the industry evolves. Immersion appears from Period 3 and, since Period 4, Nintendo, 
Sony, Microsoft and Immersion keep their positions as the major players. Nintendo 
gradually gained the competitive advantages in technological competencies and became 
the leader in Period 4 with 53 patents, while Sony has 25 and Microsoft has 37. However, 
its dominance is soon replaced by other companies. In Period 5, Microsoft occupied the 
dominant position with 127 patents, followed by NVIDIA with 92, Sony with 35 and 
Immersion with 33. Nintendo only has 20 patents, falling far behind its competitors.    
 
Additionally, we examine the number of patents and the key classes for these three major 
players, as shown in Figure 4.14. Since Sony and Microsoft become the major players 
after Period 3, we only compare their patents on the later three periods, 1996-2000, 2000-
2005 and 2006-2008. In these three periods the pattern of key classes has changed 
compared with the previous periods. While in Period 1 and Period 2 Classes 463 and 273 
are identified as the major classes, Class 345 replaces Class 273 and becomes the major 
class since Period 3. However, in Period 5, Classes 463, 345 and 715 become dominant. 
The number for Class 345, which provides means or apparatuses for computer graphics 
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processing and selective visual display systems, grows from 52 in Period 3 (126 total 
patents) to 413 in Period 4 (441 total patents) and 569 in Period 5 (613 total patents). 
Class 715, which provides for data processing means or steps, appears in 128 patents in 
Period 5. Led by Sony and Microsoft, the technology development trend in the video 
game industry seems to have been broadly extended to the domain of electronics and data 
processing. 
 
Figure 4.14 (a) US Patent No. of three major players (“game console”) 
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In Period 3 of Figure 4.14 (a), Nintendo has more patents than Sony and Microsoft, 
although the overall number is small in comparison with the following periods. In Period 
4, the overall number has greatly increased and, although Nintendo is still ahead of Sony 
and Microsoft, both are clearly catching up. In 2004 all three companies have 11 patents 
and in 2005, the number from Microsoft exceeds the number from Nintendo. Nintendo’s 
dominance is completely replaced by Sony and Microsoft in the last period, and the gap 
between Nintendo and Microsoft, the current leader, appears insurmountable. Nintendo 
seems to slow down its technological development since Period 4.    
 
Figure 4.14 (b) US Patent Class for three major players (“game console”) 
 
The patent classes for the three companies in the last three periods are then examined. In 
Period 3 and Period 4 Nintendo enjoyed overall dominance, especially in Class 345 
(relating to computer graphics processing) and Class 463 (including means for processing 
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electronic data in video games). Despite the overall performance, Sony and Microsoft 
surpass Nintendo in some other classes. For instance, in Period 3, Sony has the most 
patents in Class 348 (generating, processing, transmitting or transiently displaying a 
sequence of images) and Class 709 (relating to electrical computers and digital processing 
systems) and in Period 4, both Sony and Microsoft significantly exceed Nintendo in Class 
348. In the last period of Figure 4.14 (b), Nintendo has completely lost its dominance in 
every Class. As for the classes that have appeared in both Period 4 and Period 5, the 
number for Nintendo decreases while the patent numbers for Sony and Microsoft 
dramatically increases. Microsoft enjoyed the leadership position in the last period. 
 
In summary, we can draw the following conclusions from the patent analysis above: 
1. Nintendo didn’t show strong technology leadership in the history of the 
“technology-intensive” video game industry based on the patent data. As seen 
from Figure 4.13 along the five periods of time, the companies who are most 
superior in the technology competencies of game console development vary from 
period to period (when measured by their number of patents). Although Nintendo 
has been in the video game industry for two decades, we cannot identify evidence 
to demonstrate its dominance in terms of technology development relating to 
“game consoles”. 
2. Nintendo is weaker than Sony and Microsoft in its technological competencies. As 
indicated in Figure 4.13 and Figure 4.14, Nintendo has fewer patents than Sony 
and Microsoft in the latest period. When Sony and Microsoft entered this market 
as new entrants in 1994 and 2001 respectively, Nintendo enjoyed temporary 
advantages in technological competencies due to its longer experience. However, 
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after a period of growth, Sony and Microsoft soon replaced Nintendo’s 
technological leadership in the area of “game consoles”.  
3. Nintendo is stronger than Sony and Microsoft in terms of learning from previous 
experiences in the technology development of “game consoles”. This is indicated 
by the highest self citation rate and longest average patent age shown in Table 4.1.  
4. The technology development trend for game consoles gradually expands to the 
areas of electronics and data processing, as indicated by changes in the type and 
number of patent classes during the five periods, as we have discussed above. 
 
4.4   Wii 
The Wii, pronounced 'we', released in late 2006, is Nintendo's new home video game 
console that represents a critical step into a new era of entertainment. The most unique 
aspect of its design is called the Wii Remote, a wireless and motion-sensitive controller. 
The ergonomic design links the player’s movements and direction pointed at in space 
directly to the display and changes on the screen, acting as warrior's sword, artist’s 
paintbrush or golfer’s club, rather than the common combination of buttons and joysticks. 
As the most multifaceted gaming device ever, the Wii Remote plays into the conventional 
motions that a person makes everyday, offering an intuitive, natural way to play games. 
Except for the Wii Remote, the Wii is the only 24-hour sleepless machine ever. This 
allows Nintendo to send monthly promotional demos during the night to each Wii console 
in each household, tightly connecting Wii players to Nintendo. Satoru Iwata shared his 
thoughts on his ambitions for the “Wii” saying that “users would wake up each morning, 
find the LED lamp on their Wii flashing, and know that Nintendo has sent them 
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something …The key merit here is having promotional material delivered to your home, 
instead of having to go collect it yourself.” To promote their new strategy behind the Wii, 
a lot of video clips showing its different kinds of gameplay experiences can be 
downloaded from the Wii’s official website. The most typical examples are shown in 
Figure 4.15, describing how the Wii can be played by seniors, when all family members 
are together or in parties and gatherings.  
 




After the first launch in the U.S market on November 19, 2006, the Wii took off to an 
outstanding start with worldwide sales of 5.84 million units within the first five months. 
From Nintendo’s financial result briefing for the mid-term of FY2008, there is a 
Source: us.wii.com/experience_gallery.jsp 
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significant increase (132.5% and 143.7%) in sales and net profit thanks to sales of the Wii 
and DS Lite (Nintendo’s portable hardware). Abundant evidence from newspapers, 
magazines and company annual reports illustrates that Wii has become the world's best-
selling next-generation console. According to the console sales report for April 2008 
released by NPD.com, a leading market research company, Nintendo’s Wii and DS took 
the number one and two slots in hardware sales in April 2008, and the Wii outsold the 
PlayStation 2, PlayStation 3 and Xbox 360 combined. The Wii has successfully 
leapfrogged the Xbox360, even though Microsoft launched it a year ahead of Nintendo, 
and outsells the PlayStation 3 which features with its new Blue-ray technology. 
 
4.4.1   Wii’s development 
We present data regarding the Wii’s development process mainly based on interview 
transcripts “Iwata Asks”, available from the official website. To mark the Wii’s launch, 
Nintendo CEO Satoru Iwata conducted a unique series of interview where he revealed, in 
detail the creation of the Wii, including the Wii Hardware, Wii Remote, Wii Channels and 
the most popular million-seller game titles for the Wii. We selected the most influential 
statements from these interview sheets and interpreted them according to the company 
competencies we deduced from the literature review chapter. We categorized the 
statements into the four groups of company competencies and listed in Table 4.2. In 
addition to these documents, our data is collected from other secondary sources and public 
archives such as company financial statements, annual reports, expert electronic gaming 
magazines (EGM, Famitsu and IGN.com), business newspapers (The Economists and 
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Financial Times), technical and marketing reports from professional research 
























5: Satoru Iwata, President and CEO, Nintendo Co. Ltd. 
6: Shigeru Miyamoto, General Manager, Entertainment Analysis and Development Division 
7: Genyo Takeda, General Manager Integrated Research and Development Division 
8: Akio Ikeda, Integrated Research and Development Division, Product Development Department, Development     
Group No. 5 
9: Kenichiro Ashida, Integrated Research and Development Division, Product Development Department, Design 
Group 
10: Junji Takamoto, Integrated Research and Development Division, Product Development Department, 
Development Group No. 3 
11: Kou Shiota, Integrated Research and Development Division, Product Development Department, Development 
Group No. 2 
12: The website of Nintendo carries a series of interviews titled “Iwata Asks” on the development of Wii. See 
http://www.nintendo.com/wii/what/iwataasks/volume-1/part-1   
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Table 4.2 Data from interviews 
Competencies Types Statement Interviewee 
Conventional path would eventually lead to a battle of 
sheer brute force with competitors and fewer and fewer 
consumers would able to keep up 
General public people couldn’t tell the difference in the 
expression powers of GameCube and PS 2 on one hand, 
and N64 and PS on the other.  
Iwata5 
Only when we can make a design that's accessible to 
everyone will be able to introduce people to a variety of 
software. 
Miyamoto6 
Human-machine interface: an intrinsic part of the whole 
developmental process 
Sheer inefficiency of the path "faster and flashier" when we 
compared the hardship and cost of development against any 
new experience that might be had by our customers. 
Takeda7 
Controller: the nearest thing to the player.  Ikeda8 




Based on the kind of lifestyle our customers lead, and due 
to the fact that our controllers are wireless, I think we made 






Society's bad image about games will change if non-
gamers appreciate how enjoyable the games are, and it will 
be even easier to produce "traditional" games 
Iwata 
Wii’s controllers are perfectly suited for FPS games, as 
well as other area where rather sophisticated play control 
systems have already been established. 
Iwata 
Third-party 
developers Immediately after the external game creators had a go on 
Wii, they started coming up with ideas, discussing what 




One-handed controllers have definitely been released by 
peripheral makers. But it's not so easy for hardware 
makers to turn their back on the past and race in an entirely 
different direction. 
Iwata 
When this kind of technology is eventually integrated 
into televisions, there may no longer be any need for the 
sensor bar to reach reliability. 
Miyamoto 
Development partners have naturally tends to present us 





The technologies that form the basis of all semiconductors 
are not different from each other. Yet, how these 
fundamental technologies are applied depends on the 
device. 
Shiota11 
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Competencies Types Statement Interviewee 
Nintendo had to reply upon its first-party titles to create 
the momentum 
Iwata 
Conflicts for the game designer:  simple and easy to 
understand VS complex and challenging  
The entire software team has been under constant 
pressure to come up with new ideas to attract the public 
Miyamoto 
Many request and ideas received from game creators 
during hardware developers 
The idea of Nunchuk is a request from the development 
teams for Metroid 
Software titles ask for a new kind of controller using 







I've never encountered ID so closely connected to 
software until I started at Nintendo 
Ashida 
GameCube: a single large button standing out to be 
accessible 
Wii is turning all of Nintendo's history on its head while 
also going back to our roots 
The dominance of "d-pad with two main buttons" 
interface proves what now appears quite unusual, may 
very well become the new standard. 
GameCube was built as an extension of its predecessors 
while Wii takes a jump to a different dimension 
Iwata 
The success of NES comes from its accessibility 
Experience with the DS makes a breakthrough. People 
will try to make games simpler than they need to be. 
Miyamoto 
Nunchuk is originally designed by one of the young 
developers involved in the project aimed at selling 
packaged peripherals with GameCube games 
Specific teams were formed and given free rein to couple 
a dedicated controller or peripheral with a GameCube 
title. 
Takeda 
"Pocket Pikachu" a mobile game using a pedometer 





The GameCube controller was the culmination of all 
controllers that had come before it and it couldn't be 










This controller became a reality due to our constant 
belief in the need to keep entertainment fresh and our 
ambition to do new things 
Takeda 
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Nintendo claims that it has applied advanced technologies in unprecedented ways. “Wii 
takes full advantage of state-of-the-art semiconductor technologies, but its application of 
them differs greatly from that of other devices,” said Mr. Kou Shiota, who is in charge of 
the technological aspects of the Wii.  
 
During the Wii’s development, Nintendo mostly relied on off-the-shelf components and a 
host of technologies developed by other companies. According to Nikkei Weekly 
(February 25, 2008), the Wii’s 729 MHz chip can be bought at Kmart. From the same 
article as well as Wikipedia.org, we learnt that the Nintendo Wi-Fi USB Connector 
actually uses a common chipset and functions as a standard wireless adapter produced by 
Buffalo Technology and Ralink. Datel has released a wired LAN adapter for the Wii 
which plugs into one of the USB 2.0 ports. Mitsumi Electric also provides the Wii’s 
wireless LAN module and parts for its controllers, while helping assemble the machine. 
Nintendo’s AC adaptor is produced by Tabuchi Electric. The Opera Software, who was 
previously responsible for the browser for Nintendo's handheld hardware, takes charge of 
the development of the browser for the Wii’s Internet Channel. Even for the Wii Remote, 
the key to the Wii’s uniqueness, its central technologies are provided by Analog Devices 
Inc. and ST Microelectronics Inc. Table 4.3 shows the various components of the Wii 
Remote, their producers and the estimated cost. Moreover, Nintendo outsources nearly all 
of the Wii’s production to Taiwanese firms. In contrast to Nintendo’s outsourcing strategy, 
Sony invests heavily to create their high-tech central processing unit “Cell” and produces 
nearly 40% of the console’s components in-house, resulting in an unbearable loss. 
According to a report from iSuppli Corp., a market research company specialized in taking 
apart high-tech gears to see how they work, the loss on PlayStation 3 is more than $240 
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per console. A similar loss happens to Microsoft. Also based on iSuppli’s report, the cost 
for each HDD-equipped Xbox360 console is around $470, excluding other accessories, 
which is much higher than the two selling prices at launch: $399 for Xbox360 Package 
and $299 for Xbox360 core. Although iSuppli didn’t tear apart the Wii, the cheap price of 
Wii’s Central Processor PowerPC Broadway and the cost breakdown for the Wii Remote 
undoubtedly lead to the Wii’s lower cost. Toyo Economics TK newspaper has published a 
tear-down analysis of the Wii, and its cost is estimated to be around $160 (December 15, 
2006). Since the Wii is priced at $250, Nintendo is the only home video game console 
manufacturer who stands to make money on the hardware rather than only on the royalty 
fees from software publishers. Normally, the royalty fee is the largest part of the hardware 
manufacturers’ revenue (Southwest Securities, Interactive Entertainment Software: 
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Table 4.3 Breakdown of Wii Remote 
 
 
Sony and Microsoft also have their own strategic alliances. They partner with their world-
class suppliers and fully utilize their rich experiences in the hardware development related 
industry. For example, Sony jointly creates the Cell Broadband Engine with Toshiba and 
IBM, which provides supercomputer-like processing power equivalent to eight individual 
microprocessors. The super-powerful graphics processor Reality Synthesizer is actually 
co-developed by Sony and the Nvidia Corp. Microsoft’s successful entrance into the video 
game industry is grounded on solid partnerships with the semiconductor giant Intel, 
graphics specialist Nvidia and contract manufacturer Flextronics. There are several 
Name Producer Location Function 
Estimated 
Cost 
Accelerometer Analog Devices Boston 
Detects the 3-D movement of 





Store basic data about the 




Rohm Japan  $0.50 





Changes the analog signals 
from the accelerometer into 
digital data and sends them 
to the Bluetooth chip 
$0.50 
Rumble pack Various company Asia 
Creates vibrations, e.g., the 



















Converts analog data such as 
human speech into a digital 
data stream. This feature is 
unused now but will 
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differences in the collaborative relationships between Nintendo and its component makers 
compared to the collaborative relationships of Sony and Microsoft. First, Nintendo takes 
great initiatives to instill its innovation strategy in its partners and encourages them to 
think and contribute in a “Nintendo style” manner. “Nintendo is always trying to do 
something new and different. This message has been spread not only within Nintendo, but 
to other companies as well. As a result, our development partners have naturally tended to 
present us with new technologies and ideas,” said Mr Shiota, who is in charge of the 
technological aspects of the Wii. Second, Nintendo is good at exploring new partnerships 
beyond the boundaries of the industry. Nintendo’s collaborations with Analog Devices Inc. 
and ST Microelectronics Inc. start with the Wii’s development. MEMS accelerometers 
were originally used for crash air-bag deployment systems in automobiles, but Nintendo 
integrated MEMS technology to facilitate intuitive controls in an innovative way. 
Nintendo expanded their applications into more and more electronic products such as 
digital cameras, notebooks and mobile phones. Last but not least, rather than driven by the 
cutting-edge technologies provided by partners, Nintendo generates ideas based on its own 
experiences and company culture. As Nintendo has a history of being particular about its 
controllers, take the development of the Wii Remote as an example. According to a 
statement from Mr. Akio Ikeda, who is directly responsible for the design of controllers 
and other peripherals, controllers are the nearest thing to players and an intrinsic part of 
the whole hardware developmental process. As far back as the era of the GameCube, 
specific teams were formed and given free reign to couple a dedicated controller or 
peripheral with a GameCube titles. The GameCube’s single large button implies that 
Nintendo has been trying to make the controller more accessible for a long time. “The 
single large button was the culmination of all controllers that had come before it and it 
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couldn't be improved via the traditional concept of simply adding something”, said 
Kenichiro Ashida. There are several examples which may illuminate the idea of a one-
handed controller, such as the stylus pen of the Nintendo DS, a mobile game using a 
pedometer and a Game Boy Color game using an accelerometer.  
 
In addition to the wireless motion-sensitive controller that allows players to operate with 
one hand, the Wii adds some other new features. For instance, the Wii has another type of 
controller called the Nunchuk. It can be held in the other hand, and used simultaneously 
with the Wii Remote. The combo of the Nunchuk and the Wii Remote offers the most 
immersive gameplay experience. A typical example to illustrate the collaboration of the 
Nunchuk and the Wii Remote is playing an American football game. The player can 
control an elusive quarterback with the Nunchuk controller while looking for an open 
receiver to throw to with the Wii Remote. The Wii’s uniqueness can be also seen from its 
backwards compatibility and online capability. While the GameCube is only backwards 
compatible with the portable hardware the Game Boy, Game Boy Color and Game Boy 
Advanced, the Wii is backwards compatible with all official GameCube titles. 
Additionally, the Wii is able to play various game titles from even older game machines 
by providing downloadable games from previous Nintendo systems such as the Nintendo 
Entertainment System, Super Nintendo Entertainment System and the Nintendo 64, and 
even some non-Nintendo systems. Through partnerships with SEGA and Hudson, gamers 
are able to play classic titles from the Sega Genesis and TurboGrafx-16 on the Wii. This is 
realized through the Virtual Console, a special user-interface included in the Wii Channel 
that is a concept unexplored by any other console, and was developed as a part of the 
Initial Program Loader (IPL), the equivalent of what would be called the operating system 
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on a personal computer. Different Channels have different functions but serve a common 
objective: helping Nintendo provide new services to customers and continue 
communicating with customers after their purchase, e.g. weather forecasts, a virtual letter 
box for each family member and a fresh way to view digital photos. It also opens the door 
of “price variety” for game titles. When traditional means of distribution seem hard to 
reduce titles’ prices, this online shopping channel is likely to pave the way for lowering 
software costs. All of these discontinuous changes are achieved by Nintendo using state-
of-the-art technologies provided by its technological partners.  
 
4.4.2   Wii and Its Competing Products 
While the mainstream competitive dimension in the video game market is led by Sony and 
Microsoft’s high-end technological innovation strategy, advanced processing speeds and 
stunning graphics, the Wii tried to overthrow their dominance by discontinuous 
innovations in other aspects. For a home video game console, the processing speed, sound, 
graphics, memory, storage and media are taken as primary performances, while the 
secondary features refer to the controller, backwards compatibility, online capability and 
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Table 4.4: Comparison of four dimensions 
 
Since aesthetics and perceived quality vary from customer to customer and manufacturer 
to manufacturer depending on their subjective judgment, we will focus our analysis on 
primary performance and secondary features. To illustrate the Wii’s technological and 
commercial discontinuity along these two dimensions, not only do we make comparisons 
among the major home video game consoles in the current generation, but also extend the 
comparisons to their predecessors (Table 4.5). The early success of the PlayStation 
convinced Sony to innovate through cutting edge technological development. To satisfy 
the taste of avid gamers, they put their money and resources into the dimensions of 
primary performance for game consoles. For the PlayStation 2, Sony developed a 
powerful processor that challenged cheap PCs as the entry-level device of choice for home 
  Wii PlayStation 3 Xbox360 
Performance 
• Broadway processor, 
clocked at 729 MHz 
• Stereo sound 
• 88MB main memory 
• SDTV resolutions 
• 243MHz GPU 
• DVD 
• Cell processor, clocked 
at 3.2GHz 
• 7.1 Dolby Digital 
• 256MB main memory 
• HDTV resolutions 
• 550MHz GPU 
• Blue-ray 
• Xbox360 processor, 3 
chips clocked at 
3.2GHz 
• 5.1 Dolby Digital 
• 512MB main memory 
• HDTV resolutions 
• 500MHz GPU 
• HD-DVD 
Features 
• Motional wireless 
controller 
• Online other service 




• Wireless Controller 
• Online game 
• Back compatibility 
• Connectivity 
• Wireless Controller 
• Online game 




• Less than 51 mm (H) x 
152(W) x 216mm (D) 
• About 2kg 
• Silver 
• 98 mm (H) x 325 mm 
(W) x  274 mm (D) 
• Approximately 5 kg 
• Black & silver 
• 83 mm(H) x 309 mm 
(W) x 258 mm (D) 
• 7.7 lbs 
• Black & silver 
Perceived 
Quality 
A design for everyone Super computer entertainment system 
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access to the Web. Continually pursuing the high-tech path to super computer 
entertainment systems, Sony introduced the sophisticated next generation game console 
the PlayStation3, equipped with state-of-the-art technology such as the Cell 
microprocessor and Blu-ray format. The same mindset can also be seen in Microsoft who 
competes directly against Sony. Microsoft introduced its new next-generation console the 
Xbox360 with a triple core CPU, and an unprecedented amount of RAM (512 MB of 700 
MHz GDDR3 RAM), features that appeal to the game developers. The most outstanding 
advantage of the Xbox series is the Xbox Live online services. The Xbox Live provides a 
platform for gamers to play with other gamers, regardless of location, via a broadband 
connection, gives users access to voice chatting and downloading new content to their 
systems. Although the emergence of Xbox Live is also new and discontinuous to the video 
game industry, Microsoft’s strong technological competencies in game console 
development make it capable of heavily innovating along primary performances and 
directly fighting against Sony. Contrarily, Nintendo’s technological competencies are 
inferior and the Wii’s improvements along primary performances are relatively minor. 
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Table 4.5 Comparisons of primary performance and secondary features 
Manufacturer Nintendo Sony Microsoft 
Model Wii GameCube PS 3 PS 2 Xbox360 Xbox 
CPU 729 MHz 485MHz 3.2GHz 294MHz 3.2GHz 733MHz 
GPU 243MHz 162MHz 550MHz 147MHz 500MHz 233MHz 




Memory Card Detachable HDD Memory card Removable HDD Internal HDD 
Audio Stereo sound Stereo sound 
Dolby Digital 7.1 
surround sound 
Dolby Digital 5.1 
surround sound 





Video 480p, 480i or 576i 480p, 480i or 576i 
HDTV resolutions 
from from 480i up to 
1080p 
from 256x224 to 
1280x1024 
720p,1080i,1080p 
480i, 576i, 480p, 
720p and 1080i 
Performance 
(Primary) 
Disc Media DVD miniDVD Blue-ray DVD HD-DVD DVD 
Online 
capabilities 





















sensitive  controller 
Analog Controller Wireless Controller Analog Controller Wireless Controller 
Analog 
Controller 
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To contrast the primary performance and secondary features of these game consoles, we 
plot their offering levels into three radar charts. This is shown in Figure 4.16 and 
represents the three generations in video game history since Sony entered the market. The 
primary performances are indicated by their technical specifications of CPU, GPU, max-
resolution, ROM and RAM, which represent the offering levels of processing speed, 
graphics, storage and memory. We measure the offering levels for the primary 
performances according to their numerical figures. For instance, in the factor of CPU, both 
the PS3 and Xbox360 are 3.2 GHz, while the Wii is 729 MHz. We take the CPU for the 
PS3 and Xbox360 as 100%, which means that the Wii is about 23% (729/3200). As for the 
secondary features, the comparison relies mainly on subjective judgments. We collected 
the opinions from a specialized video game forum from China, as well as several graduate 
students in National University of Singapore and video game shopkeepers based in 
Singapore13. They were interviewed through telephones, emails or face-to-face talks. 
Finally, we got 5 respondents from forum, 6 respondents from NUS students and 16 
respondents from video game shopkeepers. All these respondents are avid gamers who 
have been playing or keen on video gaming for over ten years. And in these video game 
shops, we saw all the three video game consoles and a variety of game titles in current 
generations, as well as some game consoles and video games for previous generations. 
During the chatting with the shopkeepers, all of them said that the Wii was the best seller 
so far. The respondents were asked to score consoles according to the following rules. For 
each factor, the best offering level is scored as 10 and is used as a benchmark to measure  
 
 
13: It is a limitation to study a global market with only data from Chinese and Singaporean gamers. However, 
the demographics for the video game industry traditionally focus on age and gender rather than ethnicity. 
Additionally, due to the emergence of massively multiplayer online games (MMOGs) (Novak, 2004), the 
boundary of nations are broken, and the impact of ethnicity and geography can be eliminated. 
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the offering levels of other products in the same generation. For example, if the Wii’s 
controller is perceived as the best one, we score it as 10 and take the Wii’s offering level 
as the benchmark. Then respondents might score the offering level of the controllers of the 
PS3 and Xbox360 at 8 and 9 respectively. The process and results of the secondary 
features analysis are summarized in Appendix B.  
 
Both the PS3 and Xbox360 experience dramatic increases in terms of primary 
performances, e.g. they show nearly a 20 times increase in storage as measured by ROM, 
On the other hand, Nintendo’s increase is very slight, within the same numerical 
magnitude. Along other performance factors like central processing speed, graphics, 
processing speed and the amount of RAM, Nintendo also falls far behind its competitors 
in terms of the degree of improvement. From these charts, we can easily see the shift in 
Nintendo’s development focus. In the first radar chart, N64 enjoyed great technical 
advantages. In the second chart, when Microsoft entered this competition, Nintendo’s 
dominance is completely replaced by Microsoft, although its offering level is still 
comparable with Sony’s. The distinction of the innovation focus between Nintendo, Sony 
and Microsoft is most evident in the last radar chart. Sony and Microsoft continue to 
pursue the traditional path and compete head to head. In contrast, Nintendo is now far 
behind in primary performance, and mainly competes with Sony and Microsoft on 
secondary features. Although it is still hard for Nintendo to achieve extreme dominance in 
secondary features, it has already achieved significant success by providing a special 
controller that makes game-playing more accessible and user-friendly. 
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4.5   Conclusion 
While previous studies primarily focused on the history of the U.S. video game market 
(Gallagher and Park, 2002; Schilling, 2003; Clements and Ohashi, 2005), our approach 
was to look at a single company through a single product, which may contribute to a 
deeper and richer understanding. Following the background of the home video game 
industry, Nintendo and its Wii were introduced. The data was then presented according to 
these three levels: industry, company and product. We examined new phenomena in the 
current video game industry, Nintendo’s new innovation strategy and the Wii’s primary 
performances and secondary features compared with the PlayStation3, Xbox360 and also, 
their predecessors. We also undertook a comprehensive patent analysis. We tried to 
discover how Nintendo overcame its weakness in technological competencies and what 
kinds of company competencies played substantial roles during the Wii’s development. 
The discussion based on the data we collected from various sources will be presented in 
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Chapter 5    Discussion 
 
5.1   Introduction 
After collecting data at the industry, company and product levels, we can now address the 
two research questions raised earlier: (1) how “inferior-technology” incumbents win over 
their “superior-technology” competitors through discontinuous innovation and (2) what 
kinds of competencies are needed for established incumbents to create discontinuous 
innovations when they are technologically inferior to their peers. This chapter summarizes 
the insightful research findings, not only answering the research questions we raised 
earlier, but also illuminating some directions for further research.  
 
5.2   Discontinuous Innovation and Secondary Features 
While most of the previous literature studying the relationship between companies and 
discontinuous innovation strategies drew a line between established incumbents and new 
entrants (e.g. Abernathy and Utterback, 1978; Henderson and Clark, 1990; Tushman and 
Anderson, 1986; Anderson and Tushman, 1990; Leonard-Barton, 1992; Christensen and 
Rosenbloom, 1995; Christensen, 1997), the line between “inferior-technology” 
incumbents and “superior-technology” incumbents was seldom discussed. In dealing with 
discontinuous innovations, both “inferior-technology” and “superior-technology” 
incumbents faced similar difficulties, e.g. being bounded by existing technological paths 
and the existing customer preferences (Tilton, 1971; Hannan and Freeman, 1977; 
Tushman and Anderson, 1986; Henderson & Clark, 1990). However, almost all of these 
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studies overlooked that the degree of commitment to old technological paradigms varies 
from incumbent to incumbent according to their different technological competencies. 
Additionally, the difficulties and willingness to create discontinuous innovations also 
varied among established incumbents based on their different competency sets. Based on 
the patent analysis we conducted earlier as well as the radar chats we plotted in Figure 
4.16, we can clearly see that Nintendo is much weaker than Sony and Microsoft in terms 
of technological competencies, and that the Wii is far behind the PlayStation3 and 
Xbox360 in terms of processing speed, graphics, storage and other primary performances. 
However, its outstanding sales figures, the significant increase in profit on Nintendo’s 
financial report as well as the ranking of video game console sales conducted by NPD 
group strongly prove that Nintendo has gained undeniable success because of its new 
generation game console the Wii.  
 
The Wii is defined as a discontinuous innovation based on Veryzer (1998)’s framework. 
However, the Wii is not discontinuously innovative on each product component but 
provides extraordinary value on certain parts. Figure 5.1 exhibits the positions of the Wii’s 
performances and features using Veryzer’s framework (1998). Each bubble denotes a 
specific attribute. The detailed illustration is explicated as below. 
 
Primary performances: including processing speed, graphics, storage, audio, memory and 
media. From Table 4.5, we see a limited increase in these factors: less than a one-fold 
increase in the amount of CPU, GPU and RAM, two-fold increase in the amount of ROM, 
the same stereo sound, the same storage format, the same resolutions, and a simply 
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upgraded disk media. We positioned them in the quadrant representing a continuous 
technological and commercial capability. 
 
Secondary features: including online capability, connectivity, backwards compatibility 
and controller. From Table 4.5, the improvement along the secondary features of the Wii 
is significant, while the counterparts of the PS3 and Xbox 360 are relatively insignificant.  
 
Online capability refers to the online services provided by the game console, including 
online game playing and other activities. Compared to the GameCube, the Wii 
significantly improves in this dimension, especially along the commercial capability. As 
introduced before, the Wii is able to download various game titles from previous 
generations of game consoles through the Virtual Console, an online platform for 
downloading game content. Moreover, through other services such as the Wii Channel 
(e.g. internet channel, shopping channel and forecast channel) and a 24-hour sleepless 
connection, the Wii is able to continue communicating with customers after their purchase 
and delivers updates to customers 24 hours a day. Compared to the Wii’s competitors and 
predecessors, these new services bring a different experience to existing customers and 
inspire the interests of new customers, which fit the characteristics of commercial 
discontinuity in Veryzer’s framework. 
 
The technological capability of online capability relies on the technological capability of 
connectivity, which refers to ports and peripheral capabilities. While the GameCube is 
only able to connect with the Internet via a Broadband Adapter and Modem Adaptor, the 
Wii has achieved a significant technological leap with the help of other technology 
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providers, e.g. Wi-Fi USB connectors, developed by Ralink and Buffalo Technology; a 
LAN Adaptor, released by Datel; and Bluetooth, designed by Broadcom and 
manufactured in Taiwan (see Table 4.3). According to experienced gamers’ judgments of 
the offering levels of connectivity, the differences between Nintendo Sony and Microsoft 
have been dramatically reduced (see Figure 4.16).  From the Broadband Adaptor and 
Modem Adaptor to the USB connector, LAN adaptor and Bluetooth, the technological 
capability for connectivity improved discontinuously while the commercial function does 
not significantly change. Thus, we located connectivity in the quadrant representing 
continuously commercial capability and discontinuous technological capability. The 
technological capability of online capability is positioned the same as that of connectivity. 
 
Backwards compatibility describes the ability of new game consoles to function the same 
as the previous generation consoles. In other words, it describes whether the game titles 
from the previous generations of consoles can be run on the new generation console 
(Schilling, 2003). The Wii is completely backwards compatible with all official 
GameCube titles, while GameCube is only compatible with some portable hardware. The 
improvements of both the technological and commercial capability are continuous, leading 
to the position of backwards compatibility being the same as that of primary performances.  
 
Finally, our analysis comes to the dimension of the controller, the Wii Remote, which is 
regarded the most unique design for the Wii. Seen from Table 4.3, a lot of new 
technologies have been incorporated into the design of the Wii Remote, especially MEMS 
accelerometer technology. The Wii Remote’s technological capability is completely 
discontinuous in the history of video game controller development. As for the commercial 
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capability, the new experience created by the Wii Remote is the most attractive thing 
promoted by Nintendo in its advertising activities for the Wii. Unlike the common 
combination of buttons and joysticks, the Wii Remote can be held in one hand and 
operated in an intuitive and natural way. It can be also used simultaneously with another 
controller, the Nunchuk, which is held in the other hand. Figure 4.15 shows the typical 
experiences when different people play with the Wii. From these pictures, we easily find 
that the Wii is dedicated to providing new experiences to attract non-gamers, including 
seniors and females. In contrast to the traditional playing style, that is, the player sits alone 
on the sofa and holds the controller with two hands, the experience for gamers playing 
with the Wii is physically moving the body and having fun with other family members or 
friends. The messages delivered by these pictures strongly support Nintendo’s basic 
strategy written in its annual report: “to expand gaming population regardless of their age, 
gender or cultural background”.  This is very distinct from Sony and Microsoft’s strategies 
which aim to provide the experience of stunning graphics, crystal clear sound effects and 
astonishing processing power to hard-core gamers. Therefore, the Wii’s controller is 
absolutely discontinuous both in its technological and commercial capability, and has been 
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Based on the discussions above, we concluded that Nintendo, as an “inferior-technology” 
incumbent, successfully won over its “superior-technology” competitors, e.g. Sony, 
Microsoft, through discontinuous innovations on its product’s secondary features. Based 
on the discussions from the previous literature, discontinuous innovations are normally 
adopted by new entrants. These innovations acquire fundamentally different skills, 
sacrifice offering levels on primary performances and target at impenetrable or less 
profitable markets that are usually overlooked by established incumbents (Tilton, 1971; 
Hannan and Freeman, 1977; Astley, 1985; Abernathy and Clark, 1985; Henderson and 
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Clark, 1990; Christensen, 1997). However, through our case study of Nintendo’s Wii, we 
found that discontinuous innovations can be also adopted by “inferior-technology” 
incumbents, but with different characteristics. First, it can happen only along the product’s 
secondary features, which result in the old knowledge infrastructure still being useful in 
terms of the technological development along primary performance. Second, incumbents 
can maintain the offering levels along primary performances by conducting continuous 
innovation, although the degree of improvement may be small compared to the “superior-
technology” competitors. The continuous improvement on primary performances leads to 
the third characteristic of discontinuous innovation when initiated by incumbents, that, 
both the existing market and the new market can be taken care of. While the discontinuous 
innovation along secondary features may expand the industry boundary by attracting new 
customers, it also creates new experiences for the existing customers who may be bored 
with the existing experiences.  
 
5.3   Discontinuous Innovation and Company Competencies 
Based on the previous literature, we summarized the established incumbents’ 
competencies that help them overcome difficulties and successfully respond to 
discontinuous innovations initiated by new entrants. These competencies fall into five 
categories: market competencies of shedding unique insights about customer needs or 
identifying a new market (Abernathy and Clark, 1985), inter-firm collaborative 
relationships with technology providers (Mitchell and Singh, 1996, and Rothaermel, 2001), 
incorporating internal complementary knowledge (Tripsas, 1997), learning from unique 
historical conditions and environment turbulence (Barney, 1991; Hill, 2003) and 
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developing diversified technologies (Ahuja and Lampert, 2001). However, we are more 
curious about how established incumbents can initiatively create discontinuous 
innovations. After discovering that “inferior-technology” incumbents can win over 
“superior-technology” incumbents through discontinuous innovation along their product’s 
secondary features, we try to unveil what kinds of competencies are needed for established 
incumbent to create discontinuous innovations when they are technologically inferior to 
their peers. 
 
Based on our patent analysis, we concluded that Nintendo is weak in its technological 
competencies. Thus, we eliminated the competency of developing diversified technologies 
from our discussion. Our focus is then put on the other four competencies while 
examining the data collected at the company level and the product level. These 
competencies are regarded as companies’ heterogeneous resources, accumulated through 
their idiosyncratic history and difficult for others to emulate (Collis, 1991; Peteraf, 1993; 
Hoopes, Madsen, and Walker, 2003). 
 
Based on the findings in the previous section, we break down the discontinuous 
innovations along secondary features into four parts: the technological capability of the 
connectivity/online capability, the commercial capability of the online capability, the 
technological capability of the controller and the commercial capability of the controller. 
Table 5.1 shows the relationship between these four company competencies and the four 
parts after breaking down the discontinuous innovations along secondary features. 
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Online capability Controller   







• Communicating with customer 
after purchase 
• A virtual letter box for family 
member 
• Price variety 
  
• Accessibility 
• Controller, the nearest 
thing to the player 
(Ikeda) 




• LAN Adaptor: Datel 
• LAN Module: Mitsumi Electric 
• Wi-Fi USB connectors: Ralink 
and Buffalo Technology 
• Bluetooth: Broadcom 
• Browser: Opera 
• Partner with SEGA and 
Hudson 
• Game titles Sega Genesis 
• Game titles of TurboGrafx-16 
• Table 4.3 
• One-handed controllers have 
definitely been released by 







• Game titles of Nintendo 
Entertainment System 
• Game titles of Super Nintendo 
Entertainment System 
• Game titles of Nintendo 64 
 
• Simple and easy to 
understand gaming 
experience (Miyamoto) 
• Software titles asks for 
new type of gameplay 
(Ashida) 
• Nunchuk is a request 







• NES: accessibility 
• Turning back to the history 
(Iwata) 
• Specific teams coupling 
controller or peripheral with 
GameCube titles (Takeda) 
• GameCube: single large 
button 
• DS: stylus 
• Game Boy Color: 
accelerometer 
• Pocket Pikachu: pedometer  
• Birth of controller due 
to constant belief in 
keeping entertainment 
fresh. (Takeda) 
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In contrast to new entrants, incumbents are stronger in their marketing competencies, 
shedding unique insights about customer needs and the application of technologies 
(Abernathy and Clark, 1985). With these competencies, Nintendo discovers that the 
“conventional path would eventually lead to a battle of sheer brute force with competitors 
and fewer and fewer consumers would able to keep up” (Iwata) and that “the sheer 
inefficiency of this path when we compared the hardships and costs of development 
against any new experiences that might be had by our customers” (Takeda). Therefore, 
Nintendo shifts its innovation path and searches for innovation opportunities along 
secondary features. Since it is inferior in terms of technological competencies, the 
opportunities to win through continuous innovation seem to be slim, leading to the 
decision to create discontinuous innovations.  
 
To compensate for its weakness in technological competencies, Nintendo collaborates 
intensively with other technology providers. From Table 5.1 we see that the competency 
to collaborate with various component makers, peripheral makers and third-party 
developers realizes the technological discontinuities on the online capability, connectivity 
and controller, as well as the commercial discontinuity on the online capability. This not 
only helps Nintendo reduce costs, but also allows it to fully take advantage of cutting-edge 
technologies from others. 
 
For a product that is located in a network and can only add value to customers when it is 
combined with a complementary product, incorporating internal complementary 
knowledge can help companies generate more new ideas during the hardware 
development process. Nintendo repeatedly mentions its “software-driven” mindset in its 
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public annual reports. Nintendo’s employees also have positive appraisals of the close 
relationship between the hardware and software developing teams. “Many requests and 
ideas are received from game creator during hardware developments.”, says Ashida, “It’s 
the teamwork between our hardware and software divisions. This cooperation gives 
Nintendo the power to come up with new ideas.” Intensely incorporating knowledge from 
internal game developers helps Nintendo’s game console development team understand 
the game developers’ requirements. The “entire software team has been under constant 
pressure to come up with new ideas to attract the public.”, says Miyamoto. According to 
Ashida, “software titles ask for new types of gameplay”. Therefore, hardware 
development groups start to think about discontinuous innovations to make the game 
console more accessible and create new gaming experiences. This idea finally affects the 
design of the controller, which is regarded as “the nearest thing to gamers” (Ikeda).  
 
Last but not least, learning from successful and failed experiences from the previous 
generation consoles is the most precious competency for Nintendo, who is the oldest 
player among the current video game console manufacturers. These experiences not only 
stimulated the commercial discontinuity on the controller and online capability, but also 
provided some insightful suggestions on the technological discontinuity of the Wii’s 
controller. From the NES, Nintendo learnt that only a machine that can be easily operated 
by everyone is able to gain worldwide popularity. From the GambeCube, Nintendo learnt 
that it is impossible to improve the accessibility by simply adding something to the 
existing controller. From the DS, Nintendo learnt that a user-friendly interface can make 
the machine easily accepted by non-gamers. Especially from the DS’s stylus, Nintendo 
identified the prototype of the one-hand operated controller. From the Game Boy Color, 
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Nintendo began to think about integrating an accelerometer that could detect the 
movements of players. Finally, from the ups-and-downs in the past two decades of its 
history in the video game industry, Nintendo learnt that only by keeping a “software-
driven” and constantly innovative mindset it can go back to the root of fundamental 
problems and create breakthrough innovations in a way that “hardware-driven” companies 
are unable to do.  
 
Both the previous literature about how established incumbents respond to discontinuous 
innovations (Ahuja and Lampert, 2001; Methe, Swaminathan, Mitchell and Toyama, 1997; 
Tripsas, 1997; Rosenbloom and Christensen, 1998; Rothaermel, 2001) and this case study 
illustrating how “inferior-technology” incumbents create discontinuous innovations when 
competing with their “superior-technology” peers, effectively demonstrate the importance 
of these four competencies among incumbents’ heterogeneous resources. According to the 
terminology coined by Tyler (2001), these four competencies can be grouped together as 
companies’ “cooperative competencies”. Through this case study, we found that 
cooperative competencies not only help established incumbents defend their dominance in 
the attack of discontinuous innovations created by new entrants, but also help established 
incumbents create discontinuous innovations along secondary features when they are 
technologically inferior to their peers. This finding significantly supplements the previous 
literature on how established incumbents handle discontinuous innovations. 
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5.4   Conclusion 
This chapter summarized the most substantial findings from our single empirical case and 
answered the research questions we raised in the literature review chapter. We concluded 
that the “inferior-technology” incumbents can win over their “superior-technology” 
competitors through discontinuous innovations along secondary features and their 
cooperative competencies. Cooperative competencies include market competencies, inter-
firm collaborative relations, incorporating internal complementary knowledge and 
learning from unique historical conditions and environment turbulence. During the 
creation of discontinuous innovations, cooperative competencies can compensate for 
weakness in technological competencies. We hope that these findings can help managers 
overcome the difficulties in technological competencies development and gain uniquely 
competitive advantages. We also look forward to developing new theories and 
supplementing the research in the domain of technological innovation management, 
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Chapter 6    Conclusions and Implications  
 
6.1   Introduction 
In this chapter, we first summarize the research findings from our in-depth case study of 
Nintendo’s Wii. Implications for scholars and managers as well as, the limitations of this 
study are then explicated. Finally, this chapter is ended by pointing out some directions for 
future studies. 
 
6.2   Research Findings 
We were motivated to do this research to help established incumbents handle 
discontinuous innovations and to open the black box of company competencies. Once we 
understood why established incumbents encounter greater difficulties in the face of 
discontinuous innovations and how established incumbents successfully respond to 
discontinuous innovations initiated by new entrants, we raised the research questions that 
our study aims to address: 
 
• How do “inferior-technology” incumbents win over their “superior-technology” 
competitors through discontinuous innovation? 
• What kinds of competencies are needed for established incumbent to create 
discontinuous innovation when they are technologically inferior to their peers? 
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After carefully investigating a living case in the video game industry, we successfully 
identified the ways that incumbents create discontinuous innovation and the needed 
competencies. The most important findings are presented below: 
 
v  “Inferior-technology” incumbents can win over their “superior-technology” 
competitors through discontinuous innovation along secondary features.  
v  Cooperative competencies, including market competencies, collaborative 
relations, incorporating internal complementary knowledge and learning from 
unique historical conditions and environment turbulence are needed for 
established incumbents to create discontinuous innovation when they are 
technologically inferior to their peers.  
 
Relying on the Wii Remote’s technological and commercial discontinuity and other 
discontinuities along this product’s secondary features, Nintendo successfully won over 
Sony and Microsoft even though it remains technologically inferior to them. During the 
Wii’s development process, Nintendo discovered the changes in customers’ requirements 
and the development difficulties in the software market. Learning lessons from previous 
experiences, Nintendo came up with ideas to create discontinuous innovations along its 
controller and other secondary features. It built up tight collaborations with various 
component makers, peripheral makers and third-party developers while incorporating their 
new ideas and utilizing their new technologies. With the help of all these cooperative 
competencies, Nintendo successfully created the Wii, a discontinuous innovation.   
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6.3   Implications for Scholars 
From an academic perspective, this study emphasizes the initiatives taken by established 
incumbents in launching discontinuous innovations rather than passive responses when 
they are attacked by new entrants’ discontinuous innovations. Cooperative competencies 
are identified as the major drivers behind this competitive strategy. The previous literature 
on cooperative competencies relied on the underlying premise that the cooperative 
competencies provide a temporary competitive advantage if all else is equal (e.g. 
technological capabilities) (Tyler, 2001). For example, Tripsas’s study (1997) in the 
typesetter industry that partially evidenced that above average cooperative competencies 
can buffer incumbents from technological limitations. In our study, the case of Nintendo’s 
Wii provides a convincing example that cooperative competencies not only compensate 
for weaknesses in technological competencies, but also create an exceptional competitive 
advantage and help the “inferior-technology” incumbents retrieve their market dominance 
from their “superior-technology” peers.  
 
This study also illustrated a new type of innovation in addition to the disruptive theory 
proposed by Christensen (1997). Disruptive technology initially underperformed along the 
dimension of primary performances which mainstream customers historically valued, but 
had better offering level along an alternative dimension: it can either “attack from below” 
or “open a new niche market”. However, comparing with the typical innovations that 
result from disruptive technology, the discontinuous innovation created by Nintendo had 
some unique characteristics. It maintained the offerings along the dimension of primary 
performances which already exceeded existing customer needs, but augmented the 
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continuous innovation along primary performances by adding discontinuity (e.g. 
disruptive attributes) along the secondary features. Disruptive attributes refer to the design 
of the Wii Remote which uses MEMS technology. This case study demonstrated a new 
derivative of Christensen’s disruptive theory and opened a new door for established 
incumbents. Three strengths of this discontinuous innovation which are created by 
established incumbents along the product’s secondary features are then identified and 
compared with the discontinuous innovations created by new entrants, e.g. disruptive 
technology. Firstly, since the discontinuity only happens along secondary features, it 
doesn’t completely make the old knowledge infrastructure obsolete, especially in terms of 
the technological development along primary performance. Secondly, incumbents can 
maintain the offering level along primary performances by conducting continuous 
innovation, although the degree of improvement may be minor compared to “superior-
technology” competitors. Finally, since the traditional performances are not sacrificed, 
incumbents can maintain their existing customers who may be bored with the existing 
experiences by providing new experiences that result from the discontinuous innovation 
on the secondary features.  
 
6.4   Implications for Managers 
From an industrial perspective, although companies are encouraged to trade technology 
and knowledge world-wide rather than keep their discoveries highly secret upon the 
arrival of open innovation (Chesbrough, 2003), the competencies to integrate and 
coordinate internal resources are still keys to incumbents’ success, efficiently 
compensating for their weaknesses in technological competencies. The different ways to 
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integrate and coordinate internal resources lead to different types and directions of 
innovation. In this particular case, the strengths of both Sony and Microsoft lie in the 
primary performances of their hardware. These companies boost their superior 
technological competencies in hardware development and attract numerous third-party 
developers by providing a supercomputer-like platform. However, their “hardware-
driven” mindsets make them only focus on technology enthusiasts and ignore the nature of 
the video game industry which is to provide enjoyable experiences for all players. Thus, 
they continuously innovate along the traditional path. On the other hand, Nintendo, as a 
company specialized in creating unique “software-driven” entertainment, understands the 
nature of gaming more deeply than Sony and Microsoft. Nintendo’s “software-driven” 
mindset is developed from its competencies to incorporate internal complementary 
knowledge and learn from unique historical conditions and environment turbulence. With 
the help of this mindset, Nintendo is able to explore what gamers are really interested in 
and adjust its flexible innovation strategy. Although all three of these companies 
intensively collaborate with component makers, the different ways that they integrate and 
coordinate their internal resources eventually cause them to pursue different innovation 
paths. 
 
In contrast to technological competencies, cooperative competencies have two strengths. 
First, they are harder to imitate because they result from unique historical conditions, are 
socially complex and the causal linkage between cooperation and performance may be 
ambiguous (Barney, 1991). Second, it is easily to create flexibility through cooperative 
competency. Establishing inter-firm collaborations in various layers and areas brings in 
new opportunities and reduces the risk of core rigidity. Some support for this contention is 
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found in Hagedoorn’s work (1995) showing that most strategic technological alliances are 
not found in core businesses, but rather in businesses related to diversified interests 
developed in an effort to create flexibility. 
 
Another suggestion for managers is that, as the innovation strategy shifts, the offering 
levels of primary performances and secondary features may change. This can result in the 
major functions of the product also changing and the boundary of the industry being 
reestablished. While established incumbents always heavily invest in innovations along 
primary performances, new opportunities lie in the dimensions of the secondary features. 
These are not always appreciated by existing customers, but are able to attract new 
customers whose preferences are different from those of existing customers. The strengths 
of cooperative competencies facilitate incumbents to create discontinuous innovations 
along secondary features despite their weaknesses in technological competencies. For 
companies who are aiming to create a breakthrough innovation but lack strong 
technological support, they can concentrate their efforts for discontinuous innovation on 
one or several components rather than every single dimension of the whole product. 
Furthermore, these components can be parts of the secondary features rather than aspects 
of the primary performance in traditional innovation strategies. 
 
6.5   Limitations 
The limitations of our work are listed in three aspects: the research methodology we 
adopted, the nature of the data we relied on and the scope of the whole project. 
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As we know, case study is a research methodology that has been criticized for its 
weakness in generalization for a long time (Kennedy, 1979). Although Nintendo is a 
multi-national company, it was born in Japan and has been greatly influenced by its 
Japanese culture. Additionally, the video game industry is a special industry belonging to 
the business of entertainment. We are not sure whether our findings can be generalized to 
other industries and companies in other nations. 
 
Unlike other research strategies, such as survey, that rely on statistic generalizations, and 
experiments which can identify cause-and-effect relationships under strictly controlled 
conditions, the scientific rigor and reliability of  conclusions drawn from case studies are 
always challenged (Kennedy, 1979). In our project, we hardly verify the causal 
relationship between Nintendo’s competency set and the birth of the Wii, and we were 
unable to recreate all controlled conditions in order to test whether the same result will be 
achieved. During the investigation process only one full-time investigator was involved, 
resulting in subjective judgments of the descriptive information. Also, without the aid of 
multiple investigators, a cross-analysis was not conducted. 
 
The second limitation results from the sources of our data. We mainly draw our 
conclusions from secondary data. Although the depth and width of this data sufficiently 
support our analysis, we still feel regretful that no first-hand data was available. We would 
be more confident about the findings if we could gain access to Nintendo and conduct 
some fieldwork, e.g. interviews and observations.  
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Much of the secondary data was collected from public sources and in a retrospective 
manner which subjects it to the political constraints, competing environments and the 
memory of past events. All of these factors negatively affect the accuracy of our data and 
weaken the reliability of our conclusions. 
 
This study was conducted to fulfill the requirements for the degree of Master of 
Engineering within a two-year time period. Due to the time consideration, our focus lies 
on Nintendo and its product the Wii in the current home video game console generation 
with a limited coverage of Nintendo’s competitors, Sony and Microsoft, as well as the 
Wii’s predecessors, the GameCube, N64 and so on. By conducting a similar in-depth 
analysis for Sony and Microsoft, we could improve on the evidence that Sony and 
Microsoft have inferior cooperative competency sets compared to Nintendo.  
 
6.6   Future Research 
Capacious room is left for future research to break the limitations we mentioned above. 
Multi-case studies or a survey could be used as main research strategies to expand the 
applications of my findings into other fields, to generate testable propositions based on 
these findings and then to verify the significance of these propositions. Our work can also 
be supplemented and refined if researchers in this area are able to get access to the 
industry, the company and other players along the value chain in the future. We hope that 
followers of this project could further involve Sony and Microsoft with more exploratory 
studies. 
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In addition, this study opens the door for further research that discontinuous innovations 
can be created initiatively by established incumbents. Future studies may expand to 
broader areas, e.g. new product development, knowledge management and technology 
diffusion, and more analytical tools can be adopted, e.g. more sophisticated patent analysis 
tools, text-mining tools, etc. 
 
As a potential area for future research, it would also be very interesting to discuss about 
Wii’s unintended impacts on other industries, positioning Nintendo as a discontinuous 
entrant. For example, Wii has unexpectedly entered health care industry due to its 
contribution in helping people lose weight and improving elder people’s health, as well as 
rehabilitation.  
 
6.7   Conclusion 
In summary, this study delivered an effective solution for “inferior-technology” 
incumbents to compete with their “superior-technology” peers. We demonstrated that it is 
possible for “inferior-technology” incumbents to overcome their weaknesses in 
technological competencies by pursuing a discontinuous path along a product’s secondary 
features. In contrast, “superior-technology” incumbents are more likely to pursue the 
traditional path constantly innovating along primary performances, which is the dimension 
appreciated by existing customers. We observed that the competencies that effectively 
help established incumbents adapt to discontinuous innovation created by new entrants 
can also help established incumbents initiate discontinuous innovations when they are 
technologically inferior. These competencies are grouped together in the class named 
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“cooperative competencies”. We obtained these conclusions through an in-depth case 
study in the video game industry, but it may be limited in its ability to generalize to other 
companies and other industries. However, understanding one successful case may offer 
valuable lessons for managers who are struggling in technology-intensive competitions. 
They are encouraged to develop unique competency sets rather than restrict their emphasis 
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APPENDIX A: Definition of patent classes 
 
Class Sub-class Definition 
273   Amusement apparatus or means, e.g. games, sports 
345   Computer graphics processing and selective visual display systems 
  501 Computer graphics processing system 
  584 
Attributes wherein the information is processed that relates to the 
characteristics of visual viewing, e.g. texture 
  161 Display peripheral interface input device, e.g. joystick 
  582 
Attributes wherein the information is processed that relates to the 
characteristics of visual viewing, e.g. texture 
  609 
Attributes wherein the information is processed that relates to the 
characteristics of visual viewing, e.g. Bi-linear 
348   
Generating, processing, transmitting or transiently displaying a 
sequence of images 
  0E5.108 
Details of television systems, e.g. reception of a digital modulated 
video signal 
360 137 
Apparatus and corresponding processes for the storage and retrieval 
of information based on relative movement between a magnetic 
record carrier and a transducer 
361 703 Housing or mounting assemblies with diverse electrical components  
375   
Pulse or digital communication systems using electrical or 
electromagnetic signals 
  240.001 
Signal source is a sequence of images which normally vary with time 
and are intended to portray motion.  
  0E7.128 
Providing for systems for the transmission of television signals using 
pulse code modulation, e.g. digital video signal compression 
382 286 
Apparatus and corresponding methods for extraction of physical 
properties exhibited by imaged objects  
386 131 
Apparatus and corresponding processes having specific utility for 
treating a television signal for dynamic storage or retrieval of the 
signal, e.g. converting one television format to another. 
463   
Amusement, recreation, games, chance devices, puzzles, fortune 
telling, and others 
  039 Means for processing electronic data, e.g. wireless signal 
  042 Means for processing electronic data, e.g. network 
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Class Sub-class Definition 
705 014 
Automated electrical financial or business practice or management 
arrangement, e.g. distribution or redemption of coupon, or 
incentive or promotion program 
709   
An electrical computer or digital data processing system or 
corresponding data processing method for transferring data or 
instruction information between a plurality of computers  
710   
Electrical computers and digital data processing systems: 
input/output  
  006 
Means or steps for specifying the order in which the peripheral and 
digital data processing system or computer perform a function in 
order to transfer the user data between a peripheral and digital data 
processing system or computer 
  073 
Means or steps for making certain types of peripheral compatible 
with digital data processing system or computer, e.g. user input 
device other than a keyboard or a cursor controller. 
712   
Electrical computers and digital data processing systems: 
processing architectures and instruction processing, e.g. processors 
  207 
Locating and retrieval of instruction data for processing, e.g. 
fetching of a given instruction or variable before it is utilized 
  039 
An internal processor mode may be changed by an external means 
connected to the processor by an electrical contact 
  042 
Subject matter comprising a CPU on a single integrated circuit chip 
or on plural integrated chips or in plural discrete units which 
provide serial processing, e.g. specific functioning of the processor 
is recited 
713 171 
The transmission and reception entities exchange information 
during authentication which establishes an operational key.  
715   
Data processing: presentation processing of document, operator 
interface processing, and screen saver display processing 
717 168 
Means or steps for modifying an existing operating system, 
application program, or other executable program, in order to 
produce an upgraded or updated program.  
725 080 
Means or steps for controlling the communication with, or 
communication between, diverse elements within the structure.  
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APPENDIX B: Survey for secondary features   
 
After collected the data from the respondents, we used a statistic tool Analysis of Variance 
(ANOVA) to verify whether the data from three different sources can be combined 
together as samples from a single population. ANOVA is specialized in testing for 
differences among at least three groups, since the two-group case can be covered by a T-
test. In our study, the level of significance is set at 0.05. The results are summarized in 
Table 1.  
 
Since neither N64 nor PS had connectivity, online capability and backwards compatibility, 
the comparison in this generation is only for the controller. Furthermore, all the 
respondents give 10 to PS2 in terms of backwards compatibility. And since Xbox is the 
first product of Microsoft, backwards compatibility is not applicable. Therefore, we 
eliminate the verification of backwards compatibility of PS2 and Xbox from this 
generation. 
 
Based on Table 1, all the p-value for the F test are greater than 0.05, which indicates that 
from statistical point of view, the three samples from different sources are not 
significantly different. Therefore, we could regard them as samples from the single 
population. 
 
We then calculated the average score for each item and re-scored them according to our 
rule. Finally, in order to be consistent with the labels of primary performances, we 
translated the new scores into percentages, see Table 2.  
Creating discontinuous innovation: the case of Nintendo’s Wii 
 
                                                                                                                             - 142 -  











Controller: PS 9.6 10 9.75 0.585  9.778 
Controller: N64 8.8 7.333 7.875 0.296  7.926 
       
Connectivity: PS2 8.8 9.333 8.625 0.675  8.815 
Connectivity: 
GameCube 
2 2.333 3.5 0.529  2.963 
Connectivity: Xbox 9.8 9.833 9.063 0.273  9.370 
       
Online capability: PS2 8.6 8.5 8.063 0.774  8.259 
Online capability: 
GameCube 
0.8 1.167 3.563 0.064  2.519 
Online capability: 
Xbox 
10 10 9.625 0.406  9.778 




6.8 7.333 6.188 0.588  6.556 
       
Controller: PS2 9.6 10 9.375 0.450  9.556 
Controller: GameCube 7.6 8.167 7.188 0.484  7.481 
Controller: Xbox 8.6 9 8.5 0.750  8.62962963 
       
Connectivity: PS3 8.8 9.167 9.313 0.600  9.185 
Connectivity: Wii 8.8 9.167 8.438 0.489  8.667 
Connectivity: Xbox360 9.2 9.167 8.5 0.517  8.778 
       
Online capability: PS3 8.8 8.833 9.188 0.687  9.037 
Online capability: Wii 9.4 8.667 7.938 0.089  8.370 
Online capability: 
Xbox360 
9.4 9.833 9.25 0.472  9.407 
       
Backwards 
compatibility: PS3 
8.4 9.333 7.438 0.278  8.037 
Backwards 
compatibility: Wii 
9.6 9.833 8.75 0.336  9.148 
Backwards 
compatibility: Xbox360 
7.4 8.667 7.063 0.165  7.481 
       
Controller: PS3 8.4 8.833 8.063 0.453  8.296 
Controller: Wii 9.2 9.667 9.313 0.748  9.370 
Controller: Xbox360 8.6 9 8.938 0.811  8.889 
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Table 2: New scoring for the secondary features* 
  PS N64 PS 2 GameCube Xbox PS 3 Wii Xbox360 
Connectivity 0 0 0 0 9 90% 3 30% 10 100% 10 100% 9 90% 10 100% 
Online 
capability 
0 0 0 0 8 80% 3 30% 10 100% 10 100% 9 90% 10 100% 
Backwards 
capability 
0 0 0 0 10 100% 70 70% 0 0 9 90% 10 100% 8 80% 
Controller 10 100% 8 80% 10 100% 8 80% 9 90% 9 90% 10 100% 9 90% 
 
 * The new score is obtained from following method: for example, the average scores for the controllers of the PS and 
N64 are 9.78 and 7.93, thus, we re-score the controller of the PS at 10, and relatively, the new score for the 
controller of N64 is 8 (7.926*10/9.778). 
